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One of the most importantdevdopments in law and economics over the
last decade has been the emergence and rapid acceptance of a new type of
justificationfor thefield's long-time practice of evaluatinglegal rnles solely
on the basis of the efficiency criterion. This Article challenges these new arguments. It contends that these arguments are alternatively logicallyflawed or
reliant on untenable assumptions. The Article concludes that law and economics's exclusive focus on efficiencty continues to lad justification even
within the limited purview of modem economic reasoning.

INTRODUCTION

For as long as law and economics has played a formative role in
legal scholarship, its principal mode of analysis has been to evaluate
legal rules according to the sole criterion of "efficiency"; that is, to

judge rules by the simple sum of the costs and benefits that they impose on the population without regard to how those costs and benefits
are distributed among different individuals.'
I For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars,
see Jules L Coleman, Effciency, Utility, and ealth Maximization, 8 HoFStr\ L REV. 509
(1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and
economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. Sire,
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, RegulatingSlum HousingM aretson Behalf of the Poor Of Hozsing Codes,
HousingSubsidies and Income RedistributionPolity, 80 YaU LJ. 1093 (1971);Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21J. I.s3.u. SrvD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Furlher, 100 Yu.x LJ. 1211 (1991); Anthony T.
Kronman, ContractLaw and DistributiveJustim,89 YALE LJ. 472 (1980); ThomasJ. Miceli &
Kathleen Segerson, DefiningEfficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution,24J. Lm~i. Sitvo.
189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving NuisanceDisputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STA,. L. RL. 1075 (1980).
A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Hoard F. Chang, A LiberalTheory ofSarial lelfare:
Fairness, Utiliy, and the ParetoPrinciple, 110 Ya. LJ. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal
Theory]; Howard F. Chang, ThePossibilit ofaFairPartian,110Y.u L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, FairParetian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Verms
fiare, 114

HARv. L. REaV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, lilfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the ParaoPrindple: On the Role of Logcal Consistency, 110
237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions ofFairness). Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various
alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on de basis of other criteria, vhich they
group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. iapliow and
Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the
basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell,
Wfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that-for the very reasons criticized in the present article-Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional
considerations in evaluating legal rule& See Kaplow & Shavell, I1l/fiare, supra. Howmd F.
Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal
rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of
individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it
really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare
function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, FairParaidn,supra.
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Justifying this exclusive focus on efficiency has always required
adopting at least one of two beliefs: that the distribution of economic
well-being has no part in what defines the just society, or that the state
possesses the knowledge and ability to effect the sort of perfectly corrective transfers that could costlessly and precisely undo any unde2
sired distributional effects of a legal rule.
Some of the most influential early proponents of the law-and-economics approach adopted one or the other of these beliefs as their
rationale for focusing on efficiency. Over time, however, the consensus in law and economics has shifted away from both premises. Although ' 3disagreements remain about how much weight to place on
"equity as a social value, few scholars today would argue that the
proper weight truly is zero. At the same time, the ascendancy of "information economics" 4 has bred skepticism about the feasibility of

perfectly corrective transfers. Scholars now understand that rearranging the costs and benefits of a legal rule requires information about
the rule's impact on each individual. This information is often known
only to the individual herself and is thus difficult to obtain, given an
individual's natural incentive to overstate her costs and downplay her
benefits in order to improve her treatment under the corrective
5
transfer.
2 Why does the ability to precisely and costlessly effect such corrective transfersjustify
setting legal rules solely on the basis of efficiency? Suppose, to take an extreme example,
that the state demands perfect equality, but that, given perfect equality, it prefers that the
equal amount allocated to each individual be greater rather than smaller. Imagine that
the state has the ability to costlessly "re-slice the pie" however it pleases, Further, consider
a world in which legal rules are inefficient, but there is perfect equality. Then, the state
should change legal rules so that they are efficient-i.e., so that they maximize the size of
the pie-even if that initially produces inequality. After changing legal rules, the state can
always re-slice the larger pie to restore the system to perfect equality. The end result is still
perfect equality, but each individual now has greater wealth. For a fuller explanation of
this point, see A. MITCHELL POLINsKy, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND EcONoMINcs 7-9 (2d
ed. 1989).
3 "Equity" in this context refers to "equality of economic well-being." To value equity
is to prefer social outcomes with less economic inequality to those with more, all else the
same. Following the literature it critiques, this Article will focus on equality of oulcotes
rather than equality of opportunities or "starting points." Yet, as Part II suggests, much of
this Article's analysis also applies to equality of opportunity. Indeed, the analysis applies to
any policy goal posited as an alternative to efficiency.
4 The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 1996,
was awarded to James A. Mirrlees and William Vickrey "for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information." Press Release,
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Oct. 8, 1996), http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1996/press.html (last modified Feb. 5, 2001). For a review of the literature, see DAVID M. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577-660 (1990).
5 In the economics literature, transfers tailored to each individual's true and complete underlying situation are called "lump-sum transfers." The ex post "re-slicing" described above requires fashioning such lump-sum transfers. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. Were they feasible, such transfers could be used not only to correct
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Yet even as support within law and economics for both of these
premises has eroded, the field's focus has, if anything, tightened
around the efficiency criterion. This continued acceptance of efficiency, but not its premises, has produced a dissonance within law and
economics that, depending on how closely one chooses to listen, can
be piercing to the ear. And perhaps the resulting discomfort explains
the recent emergence and rapid acceptance of a new justification for
efficiency, a "new efficiency rationale," that claims to allow the scholar
to be both concerned about equity and skeptical of the feasibility of
corrective transfers while still remaining focused solely on efficiency
in evaluating private law rules.
The new rationale sets out to accomplish this feat by shunting
distributional concerns across disciplinary boundaries from private
law to tax. While conditionally conceding the importance of equity as
a political-philosophical value, proponents of the new rationale insist
that the legal sphere is not the proper place to pursue distributional
objectives. Efforts to decrease economic inequality, they argue,
should be corralled into the tax code, while legal rules should be left
in a pristinely efficient state, unsullied by distributive justice. 6
Perhaps due to its timeliness and potential convenience, the new
rationale has been almost immune from the sort of close scrutiny that
such a foundational principle deserves. Indeed, until very recently
there was essentially no critical appraisal of the new rationale on its
own terms, as an exercise in law-and-economics reasoning. 7
the undesirable distributional consequences of other policies, but also to effect redistribution de novo. Yet, as Mirrlees notes, "[i]t is generally agreed by economists that the lumpsum transfers necessary to [accomplish perfectly corrective transfers] are scarcely ever feasible. There is no way of obtaining the information about individuals that is required except in a society of individuals who are truthful regardless of selish considerations." J.A.
Mirrlees, The Theory of Optimal Taxation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF N&\niF-_ tnuL EcoN oM cs
1197, 1197-98 (KennethJ. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligater eds., 1986) (footnote omitted).
6 See, eg., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, I'7ty the Legal System is Less Effiident than the
Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994) ("[I]t is appropriate
for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency and to ignore the distribution of
income .... ."); see also sources cited infra note 132.
7 For a behavioral critique, see, for example, ChristineJolls, BehavioralEtonomic Analysis of RedistributiveLegal Rules, 51 VANr. L REV. 1653, 1656 (1998). Jolls points to psychological evidence that, despite economic theory, "uncertain events-such as incurring tort
liability-are often processed very differently from certain events," and that redistributing
income via tort rules might be less distortionary than redistributing income by tax if individuals do not take full account of the effect on tort rules of their earning more. Id. For a
practical and political critique of the new rationale, see Scott Shapiro & Edward F. McClennen, Law-and-Economicsfrom a PhilosophicalPesprctive, in 2 THE NEw P.%tGc,%%m Dicnomw
OF EcoNoMIcs AND THE LA.Nv 460, 463 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). The authors argue: "One
dear problem with [the new rationale] is that it... presupposes that other state agencies
will engage in a rather aggressive form of wealth redistribution. Absent some radical restructuring of current political systems, however, this proposal must reside within vdhat is
sometimes called 'ideal' political theory." Id.
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A recent exchange between this author and some of the chief
proponents of the new rationale 8 may signal a change in this regard.
But although this exchange has helped to put the topic on the table, it
leaves many important issues unresolved. This Article picks up where
that initial parley left off. It refines, clarifies, and makes accessible to
the general reader the arguments that arose in that more technical
exchange. It responds to new defenses raised in favor of the new rationale in that discussion. It also steps beyond the boundaries of existing discourse to consider other important issues that must be
addressed before this debate can be settled to the satisfaction of the
broader community of lawyers and legal scholars.
Part I summarizes and critiques the "double-distortion argument," which forms the backbone of the new rationale. The doubledistortion argument rests on the idea that conditioning the application of legal rules on parties' incomes will affect their decisions in the
labor market in much the same way as directly taxing their earnings.9
Increasing an individual's expected damages bill when she earns more
affects her incentive to earn in the same way as does increasing her tax
bill. Thus, effecting redistribution by conditioning legal rules on income distorts not only the behavior that the legal rule is meant to
regulate (e.g., precautionary behavior, if the rule is in tort), but also
labor-leisure choice. Redistributing income by taxing income directly,
however, requires suffering only the single distortion to labor market
decisions. 10 As one distortion is better than two, the argument continues, only the income tax should be employed in pursuit of redistributional goals, and it is thus appropriate for the economic analysis of
legal rules to focus on efficiency."
Yet whether or not the double-distortion argument is valid on its
own terms, the conclusion that legal rules should always be set solely
on the basis of efficiency is a non sequitur. Here it is important to
distinguish between two logically separate questions: (1) Should legal
rules be set purely on the basis of efficiency or should they also be
informed by considerations of economic equity? and (2) Should the
application of legal rules in each case be made conditional on the

8 Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More
EquitableApproach, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). Sanchirico's article was first circulated in
November 1997 and appeared on the Social Science Research Network on December 25,
1997. See SocIAL SCIENCE ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NEovoIU, at
http://v.ssrn.com (last visited June 2, 2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should
Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarinfingthe Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) (responding to Sanchirico).
9 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 677.
10 See id. at 667-69.
11 See id.
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relative incomes of the affected parties? 12 These questions are truly

distinct. A legal rule has a redistributional impact whenever it affects
different individuals differently. And differential effects exist even
when application of the rule in each case does not turn on the taxable
attributes of the particular parties involved.
The double-distortion argument applies only to the second of
these two separate questions. The equity-informed legal rule discussed above in explicating the double-distortion argument distorts
labor-leisure choice (thereby producing a second distortion) only because each individual understands that any application of the legal
rule to her will turn on her particular level of income. Without this
sort of "specific income conditioning" there is no second distortion.

Moreover, even as an argument against specific income conditioning per se, the double-distortion argument is suspect. The sort of

distortion counting that the argument employs ignores the fact that
distortions may well counteract one another. As the "theory of second
best"' 3 makes clear, it is no more appropriate to sum up distortions in
measuring efficiency cost than it is to sum individual asset variability
in measuring portfolio risk.14
Part I presents an alternative perspective on redistributional policy, one opposed to the tax-centric view of the new rationale, but, perhaps ironically, fundamental to the field of optimal taxation,' 5 which
purportedly grounds the new rationale. From this perspective, income, wealth, consumption, contractual activity, property owned,
harm caused, harm suffered, and the like, are all imperfect signals of
the underlying immutable characteristics of individuals (sometimes
called "preferences" and "endowments") upon which the state would
ideally base its redistributive policy if only it had such information at
its disposal.' 6 Such signals are "imperfect" because they are determined in part by individual choice. Attempts to redistribute based on
these imperfect signals thus inspire distortionary behavioral adjustments. The necessity of relying on such imperfect signals to redistribute produces in turn a tradeoff between equity and efficiency;
transfers from well-off to less well-off must be made with the proverbial leaky bucket.
12 As in the literature it critiques, this Article will focus on "inorneconditioning." The
analysis applies as well to making legal rules contingent on any other potentially taxable
attribute.

13
14

See infra note 35.
S, id
15 The literature on optimal taxation is large. One of the best discussions is found in
Nicholas Stem, The Theory of Optimal Coinynodij' and Inome Taxalion:An Introdution,in ThE
THEORY OF TAxATION FOR DEVELOPING CoUNTmEs 22 (Dadid Newbem, & Nicholas Stem

eds., 1987).
16

See supra note 5.
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Under this alternative view, no particular imperfect signal (such
as income) is favored a priori. Indeed, it makes little sense to talk
about one signal being "more efficient" than another, because a signal's efficiency-much like the productivity of labor and capital in
firm production-can only be expected to vary with how much the
signal is used both in an absolute sense and relative to other signals.
Thus, contrary to the impression given by double-distortion reasoning, the bare logic of the situation does not dictate sole use of the
income tax in pursuit of redistributive goals.
Indeed, under standard assumptions, the framework actually
leads to a strikingly different conclusion. While the double-distortion
argument suggests that legal rules should never be informed by redistributive objectives, the imperfect-signals framework just described implies the more-than-opposite proposition that legal rules should always
(i.e., not just sometimes) be redistributionally informed.
The reason has to do with the definition of "efficiency." The fact
that an efficient legal rule maximizes the size of the pie means-by
the usual argument that margins are zero at a maximum-that there
will be no marginal efficiency losses associated with moving off of the
perfectly efficient point. There will, however, be nonzero marginal
equity effects because, of course, the perfectly efficient point does not
also maximize equality. Indeed, moving off of the perfectly efficient
point in the right direction will positively reduce inequality on the
margin.
The presence of marginal equity gains and the absence of marginal efficiency losses means that perfect transfers are possible on the
pure efficiency margin. In other words, at the perfectly efficient point
the marginal bucketful will not leak. Thus, the general point that the
redistributional efficiency of a policy instrument depends upon how
much it is being employed has a very specific implication when we
consider the point at which the instrument is not being used at all. At
that point it is momentarily a perfect redistributional instrument, and
over some range around that point it remains nearly perfect.
If, therefore, we currently conduct no redistribution through the
legal system, the legal system is initially available as a perfect means of
transfer. If, in addition, we already have a substantial redistributional
income tax in place, that tool's redistributional efficacy is under
strain, and every dollar transferred by that means exacts potentially
significant efficiency costs. Consequently, it will always improve social
welfare to pull the well-rested legal system off the bench to relieve the
fatigued income tax of some of its redistributional burden.
Given the optimality of some redistributional adjustment to legal
rules, what form should it take? Should redistributional adjustments
be made across the board, based on population-wide correlations (so
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that every defendant pays damages equal to 110% of harm, for instance) or should such adjustments be made by conditioning case outcomes on the income or wealth of the specific parties that stand
before the court? This issue relates directly to the second question
identified above in the discussion of double-distortion reasoning.
There it was noted that any argument against specific income conditioning based on double-distortion logic is suspect given the hazards
of distortion counting. Part II confirms this suspicion by demonstrat-

ing that specific conditioning on the observable economic attributes
of the particular parties before the court is actually welfare-improiing.
In general, making application of taxes and rules "cross-dependent"
enables the state to more finely tailor use of the imperfect signals
upon which it is obliged to build its redistributional policy.
Part BEI responds to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's recent defense of the new rationale and addresses several other potential objections regarding the main argument for equity-informed legal rules.
This Part first attempts to sort out some possible confusion regarding
different uses of the phrase "redistributing income." Despite its frequent use of this phrase, 17 the new rationale is not actually an argument about how best to equalize the distribution of income per se.
Nor does it concern the issue of how transfers should be made (e.g.,
in cash as opposed to in kind). Rather, it is an argument about how
transfers should be detennined given the object of mitigating inequality
in overall well-being.
Part III next considers some confusion that has arisen concerning
the direction in which legal rules should be adjusted for equity purposes. The full analysis in Part H, which was summarized above, indicates that relative to efficient standards, legal rules should be adjusted
in a manner that tends to favor the less well-off. In determining who
the less well-off are, well-being should be measured across all spheres
of economic activity and notjust the regulatory ambit of the legal rule
that is being adjusted. For example, if the poor are less well-off overall, but happen to be more well-off within the system governing boating accidents, then tort rules for boating accidents should be adjusted
to help the poor, even though this is actually disequalizing within the
narrow sphere of boating torts. Nevertheless, in their recent defense
of the new rationale,' 8 Kaplow and Shavell assert that the sort of equity adjustment that is described in Part II may have the perverse ef-

fect of hurting those who are less well-off overall just because they
happen to be relatively advantaged within the sphere governed by the
legal rule. This assertion is incorrect.
17

18

See, eg., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6 (using this phrase in its tile).
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 822.
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Part III also clarifies certain other aspects of the equity role for
legal rules. First, even if legal rules were a relatively unimportant
source of overall inequality, as some claim, this does not imply that
legal rules should be set purely on the basis of efficiency. Nor is the

implication restored if there are substantial "fixed costs" associated
with using any given instrument for redistributional purposes. Second, the fact that in certain circumstances rule changes can be "bargained around" does not defeat the optimality of adjusting legal rules
for equity purposes. Third, on a more technical level, it is incorrect to
suppose that the equity role for legal rules exists only by virtue of
cross-effects with labor-leisure choice, or only insofar as there exist
within-income-group differences among individuals. The argument
for equity adjustments remains vital even in a world in which each
individual's various choice problems are entirely separable, and even
in a world in which individuals at each level of income are also identical in every other respect. Thus, the equity role for legal rules is not
limited to mitigating inequalities that derive from labor market differences. Nor is it limited to mitigating only those inequalities that the
income tax cannot reach.
Part IV conducts a critical analysis of several additional arguments-arguments unrelated to optimal taxation or double-distortion
logic-that have been put forth as reasons why legal rules should play
no role in redistributional policy. Some commentators argue that determining the proper adjustment to legal rules would present serious
information problems for policymakers. 19 But as compared to what?
Determining the proper redistributional adjustments to taxes is also
fraught with theoretical ambiguity and requires substantial empirical
determination.2 0 Indeed, the data required to structure an approximately optimal redistributive tax is the same in form as that required
to structure an approximately optimal redistributive legal rule: one
needs data on both redistributional impact (the correlation between
incidence and well-being) and distortionary cost (the elasticity of relevant choices with respect to the policy change).
One might argue that such data is more readily available for the
income tax. But the appropriate test at this level of discourse should
be whether the data could be collected, not whether it currently exists:

there will always be more data on the policy currently in place. In any
event, insurance companies have consistently gathered precisely the

19
20

See id. at 822-23 (arguing that the tax alternative is simple and more precise).
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, DistributionalTables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of

Precision, in DiSTRmITONAL ANALysIs OF TAX Poucy 15, 18-19 (David F. Bradford ed.,

1995) ("The current practice of fashioning tax legislation to achieve a particular result in a
distribution table creates the illusion of precision when such precision is impossible.").
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sort of data necessary for optimal adjustments in important areas of
the private law.
In addition, opponents to redistributing by legal rule often cite
the supposed haphazardness with which adjustments to tort rules, for
example, would accomplish redistribution. 21 This Article identifies
and critiques two forms of the "haphazardness objection." One form
is the assertion that legal-rule redistribution would be keyed to the
random event of litigation and would focus on individuals who happened to find themselves in a dispute over an accident. This view focuses too narrowly on accident law, overestimates the certainty and
scope of feasible forms of taxation, and also underestimates the ability
of insurance to transform the uncertain and narrow contingency into
the definitive and broad-based premium. Moreover, the horizontalequity arguments that lie behind this first manifestation of the haphazardness objection are plagued by several debilitating ambiguities.
The notion that like be treated alike begs the question of who to consider "alike" and whether to measure "treatment" ex ante or ex post
the event that triggers redistribution.
The second form of the haphazardness objection points to the
fact that the proper adjustment to legal rules, which is inevitably based
on imperfect population-wide correlations, will on occasion redistribute in the wrong direction. Once again, this objection implicitly ascribes to taxation a perfection that a moment's review of the tax code
belies. The income tax is as haphazard in this respect as legal rules:
some individuals with low income and thus low taxes spend from sizeable inheritances; others with high income and high taxes work
twelve-hour days having incurred substantial investment costs to develop the skills that keep their wages high.
In any event, arguments against redistributional adjustments that
will be right on average but wrong occasionally assume that the status
quo-which will by hypothesis be wrong on average and right occasionally-deserves special standing. The possibility of error is an inevitable characteristic of all policy choices, including the one that we
arbitrarily consider the baseline against which all other choices are
"adjustments."
Even if the reader accepts the arguments for equity-informed legal rules that this Article lays out in Parts II-IV, an unanswered question remains. The literature contains rigorous mathematical proofs
concluding that policymakers should employ only income taxes for
redistributive purposes. How can one reconcile these seemingly airtight proofs with the assertion made in Part IT that policymakers
should always include legal rules in redistributional policy? The an21

See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 832.
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swer, not surprisingly, lies in the often implicit assumptions upon
which these proofs are based. Part V identifies those assumptions
and, by doing so, demonstrates that these applications of mathematical logic are both far less remarkable and far less relevant than has
22
been supposed.

I
THE

DOUBLE-DISTORTION ARGUMENT FOR PURE EFFICAENCY

Verbal manifestations of the new rationale are built upon a line
of reasoning called the "double-distortion argument.125 The purpose
of this Part is to explain this reasoning and then describe its flaws.
Indeed, the double-distortion argument is, appropriately, doubly
flawed. First, even if double-distortion reasoning were valid on its own
terms, it would not support the broad conclusion that legal rules
should be set solely on the basis of the efficiency criterion. Second,
double-distortion reasoning is in fact not valid on its own terms and so
fails to support even the narrower conclusion that legal rules should
be independent of parties' incomes.
A.

The Double-Distortion Argument Explained

Imagine the following redistributionally motivated modification
to the level of damages under strict liability: when a court finds that a
defendant was the proximate cause of an accident it must order the
defendant to pay compensatory damages plus ten percent of the
amount by which her income exceeds the plaintiff's. Thus, if a defendant who earns $100,000 a year is found liable to a plaintiff who earns
only $20,000, the defendant must pay the plaintiff for the harm she
caused, plus $8,000. And if,
in this example, the plaintiffs and defendant's earnings were reversed, the defendant would pay compensatory
damages less $8,000.24 Either way, the rule accomplishes a transfer
from rich to poor.
But the redistribution this rule accomplishes comes at the cost of
a reduction in total well-being; in other words, it is inefficient. There
are two sources of this inefficiency. The first concerns precautionary
activity. If we wanted to encourage potential injurers to take precautionary measures so as to maximize total well-being, we should charge
them for the harm they cause to others. In choosing their level of
22 The Technical Appendix provides formal proofs for the main assertions of this
Article. When the Technical Appendix is relevant to verbal argument in the main text, this
is indicated by footnote.
23 Part V examines the formal, mathematical manifestations of the new rationale.
Parts III and IV examine other arguments for not redistributing by legal rule.
24
To avoid "negative damages" the rule could be amended so that defendant would
be required to pay the greater of zero or the damages calculated using the rule as it stands.
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precaution, they would then balance their private cost of precautionary effort against the benefits of reducing accidents to themselves and
to society. This is precisely the calculus of the fictional, purely efficiency-focused "social planner," who chooses legal rules according to
aggregate costs and benefits. The fictional planner, like the injurer

under this rule, would balance aggregate precautionary effort (which
happens to reside solely with the injurer in this simple setting) and
aggregate accident costs.m
But under the legal rule this subpart considers, the level of damages paid by tortfeasors does not necessarily equal the harm that they
cause. Defendants with high incomes relative to the rest of the population will tend to be pitted against plaintiffs whose income is lower
than theirs. Under this rule, therefore, these defendants will tend to
have to pay a positive premium over and above the harm to the plaintiff whenever they cause an accident. By symmetrical reasoning, lowincome individuals can expect to pay less than the harm they cause.
As a result, potential tortfeasors will not generally choose their
level of precaution in a manner that balances aggregate costs and benefits. High-income individuals will likely react by adopting a level of
precaution whose direct cost to them exceeds the benefit to society in
terms of reduced accident costs. Inversely, low-income individuals will
likely take less precaution than warranted by total social costs and
benefits.
The second source of inefficiency concerns the choice of how
much to work. Absent any externalities, an individual would be choosing her level of work effort to maximize total social well-being if she
balanced the value of her leisure time against the social value of what
she would produce if working. But under the double-distortion modification of strict liability, when an individual decides whether to work
an extra hour, she considers not only the value of her leisure time and

the value of her product (via her wage), but also the effect that the
amount she earns will have on damages should she find herself a defendant in a tort action. Working an extra hour increases her likely
damages premium and decreases the damage premium she is likely to
receive. 2 6 Thus, the price of the redistribution accomplished by this
25 This discussion makes the simplifying assumption that only the injures choice of
care matters. If the victim's care choice were also considered, then strict liability would not
be efficient even if damages were set equal to the harm caused. For a clear discussion of
efficient tort rules, see PouNsiw, supra note 2, at 39-52.
26

In general, wealth effects will also cause distortions. The literature supporting the

new rationale typically rules out these distortions, rel)ing on the assumption that individual utility functions are separable. If utility functions are separable, precaution choice is
independent of income level (except to the extent that damages depend on income). For
a further discussion of the separability assumption, see infra Part VNA2(b). Note that the
existence of distortions due to wealth effects favors neither redistributional venue.
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modification of strict liability is a double-distortion. It distorts not
only precautionary effort, but also work effort.
In contrast, so the double-distortion argument continues, if one
effected the same redistribution by income tax instead of legal rule, just
the single distortion to work effort would result. Because individuals
would still not keep all of what they earn, they would fail to balance
the full social benefits of their work effort against the value of their
time. But at least redistribution by income tax would not also distort
their choice of precautionary effort.
27
B. Efficiency as a Non Sequitur

Suppose that we accept double-distortion reasoning as valid.
What does it imply? According to this reasoning, the legal rule is a
poorer tool for redistribution than the income tax because the legal
rule distorts not only precautionary choice, but also labor-leisure
choice. The source of the later distortion is the fact that damages are
tied to income earned: earning more means having to pay more in
damages should one cause an injury, whereas earning less means having to pay less in damages. Without this functional dependence the
damages rule would be irrelevant to labor-leisure choice.28 If damages are x when the individual eams a lot and still x when she earns a
little, then damages have no effect on her choice of how hard to work,
whatever the value of x. The double-distortion argument is really,
then, simply an argument against redistributing by conditioning the
application of legal rules on the income of the parties.2 9
The conclusion appended to the double-distortion argument,
however, is that legal rules should be set according to the sole criterion of efficiency.30 Yet, an argument against income conditioning is
not necessarily an argument for efficiency. The fact that a rule is independent of income does not mean that it is efficient. If, for instance,
one abolished the tort system altogether, letting the cost of accidents
lie where they fall, our effective tort rules would not be conditioned on
income-but neither would they be efficient.
In particular, redistributionally motivated deviations from efficiency that are not tied to income3 ' are simply not subject to doubleThe arguments in this subpart are made in Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 799-800.
But see supra note 26.
29 Part I.C argues that the double-distortion argument is not valid even in this limited
capacity.
30 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 677.
31 A separate issue is whether the efficient (more precisely, sum-of-utilities-maximizing)
rule is wealth dependent. See Kenneth S. Abraham &John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages
and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 417-18 (1989)
(arguing that efficient deterrence requires that damages be independent of wealth); Arlen,
supra note 1 (arguing that Abraham andJeffries's results do not apply when individuals are
27
28
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distortion reasoning. For instance, our concern for equity may cause
us to increase damages by $1,000 above harm caused.3 2 This change
certainly "distorts" precautionary behavior. But it does not cause a
33
second distortion to work effort.

Thus, a logical chasm runs between the double-distortion argument's intermediate conclusion that legal rules should not be conditioned on income and its ultimate conclusion that legal rules should be
set solely on the basis of efficiency. In terms of the sort of distortioncounting that the double-distortion argument invites, income-independent legal rules are on the same footing as hanm-independent income taxes: both "distort" the activity to which they are directed, but
neither has primary behavioral consequences beyond its immediate
34
realm.
C. The Fallacy of Distortion Counting
Given that the double-distortion argument does not reach income-independent changes in legal rules, is it at least valid as an argument against conditioning legal rules on the income of the parties
involved? The answer here is also "no." The double-distortion argument employs a form of "distortion counting" that was discredited
long ago. The "theory of second best," initiated in economics by Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, teaches that eliminating some distortions is not necessarily welfare-improving in a world in which other
distortions remain (perhaps because policy changes simply cannot
eliminate them).35 Distortions may counteract one another, and eliminating some of them may exacerbate the negative impact of those
that remain. 3 6
risk averse); Miceli & Segerson, supra note 1 (qualifing Arlen's anal)sis). The issue at
hand concerns income (or wealth) dependence for the purpose of equalizing the distribution of well-being.
32 See infra Part II.B.
33 This basic conclusion is not limited to such simple adjustments. Imagine a "damages schedule" that associates each level and type of harm caused with a dollar amount of
damages owed. In form, this would resemble a tax schedule, which associates each level of
earned income with a dollar amount of tax: The left column of each table contains the
observable characteristic of the individual-harm for the damages table, income for the
tax table-and the right lists the payment, to the party or the state, or to some combination of both. Just as the tax schedule does not distort precautionary effort, the damages
schedule would not distort work effort.
34 But see supra note 26.
35 See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best,24 RE%. Ecox.
STUD. 11, 11-12 (1956-57). For application of this principle to the law, see, for example,
Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Alloalite Ineffiden , of First.Bcst.llzatiL'Efftcent
Tort Law in Our Worse-than-Second-Best WorId The ii7 ys and Some Thereforeus 46 GSE W. REs. L
Rzv. 313 (1996).
36 See Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 35, at 11-12.
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In other words, the welfare detriments of multiple distortions
combine, not like simple numbers, but like the market risk of multiple
assets. Two risky assets may form a portfolio with less risk than that of
either asset taken alone. The assets may hedge each other: their risk

profiles may counteract one another. Similarly, two distortions may
counteract each other's deleterious effect on efficiency.
Thus, the bare fact that using legal rules instead of the income
tax to redistribute causes an additional distortion to tort-related behavior does not necessarily mean that tort-law redistribution is inferior
from an efficiency point of view. The additional distortion to tort behavior could easily have a mitigating effect on the shared distortion to
labor-leisure choice.
II
THE OpnMAL-TAx ARGUMENT FOR EQUITY-INFOiRED
37
LEGAL RuLES

The new efficiency rationale sends mixed signals about the income tax. On the one hand, it is careful to note that the income tax is
not a corrective "lump-sum transfer":38 one cannot deploy the income
tax after-the-fact to costlessly clean up any undesired distributional effects of an efficiency-enhancing legal rule. The new efficiency rationale clearly accepts that the income tax is also subject to distortionary
effects. Indeed, the new rationale's use of the income tax in lieu of
the mythical lump sum transfer is part of what makes it "new."
On the other hand, the new efficiency rationale encourages us to
think of the income tax as somehow unique: as a redistributional tool
that, although flawed, stands apart from the other blunt and collaterally destructive redistributional instruments. 39 In some ways, this is an
appealing construction. The income tax has been and remains the

celebrity of redistributional instruments, and it may be difficult to resist confusing the fact of its prominence in actual distributional policy
with the idea that this must or should be so.
But a closer look demonstrates that the income tax is on the same
footing as the lot of other redistributive tools. And it is perhaps ironic
that the "optimal taxation" framework, 40 pioneered by Nobel prizewinning economistJames Mirrlees and now used by proponents of the
new efficiency rationale to demonstrate the unique position of the
37

Part.
38
39

See the Technical Appendix § B.2 for a formal proof of the main assertions in this

See supra note 5.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 822-23.
40 See, e.g., Mirrlees, supra note 5; Stem, supra note 15, at 27-46; Jeff Strnad, The
Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes 8-32 (July 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (detailing the foundations of the optimal tax program).
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income tax,4 1 is precisely the framework in which to see that this is
S.

4 2

Before substantiating this claim, it is important to clarify the purpose of the enterprise. No claim is being made that the optimal-tax
analysis provided in this Part proves definitively that policymakers

should always set legal rules with equity in mind. The purely economic arguments in this Part do not address all relevant considerations. 43 What is claimed-definitively-is this: The kind of analysis
provided here, which forms the most prominent argument for pure
efficiency in law, not only fails to support the claim that legal rules
should never be redistributive, but leads to the more than opposite
conclusion that redistributive goals should always inform legal rules.
A.

The Optimal Choice of Taxes and Rules as a Signaling
Problem44

The foundational logic of the optimal-tax literature rests on the
practical inapplicability of one of the abstract principles of welfare economics. 45 This excluded principle instructs that the target of a program of redistributive taxation ideally should be individuals'
underlying, immutable characteristics such as their genetic abilities,
their inheritances both intangible and tangible, and their preferences.
41

See infra Part IIl.

This Part inherits, to varying extents, the focus and the starting point of the literature that it addresses. Three of these bequests are worth noting.
First, the focus of that literature is on taxes versus tort rules, as opposed to legal rules
in general. It is understood in that literature that tort law is used as a proxy for the private
law as a whole. To the extent that the examples herein also focus on tort law, this Article
encourages the same understanding. In any event, this Article does address the unique
problems of other areas of law, such as contract and labor law. See iqfra Part IIl.G.
Second, the existing literature also assumes that equity of outcomes, rather than equity of opportunity, should be the object of redistributional policy. This Article, too, proceeds as if this were the goal. It should be noted, however, that the arguments employed in
this Part, and elsewhere in the Article, apply with equal force whether the distributive goal
is to equalize "starting points" or outcomes. At the risk of getting ahead of the argumen:
there will still be no efficiency loss on the pure efficiency margin and, thus, to the extent
that legal rules have a differential impact on individuals' opportunities, policymakers
should adjust them away from efficiency in an effort to equalize these opportunities.
Third, in the models in this literature maximizing total utility yields a (Pareto) efficient outcome, and one which corresponds to that obtained wsith Pigouian extermalitycorrecting policies (such as setting damages equal to harm). For more on this technical
issue, see Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 816 n.20.
43 For discussion of these considerations, see infra Parts II-MV.
44 The basic contours of the argument in this and the folloming subpart appear in
Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 802-03.
45
The second welfare theorem states that under certain conditions, the economy can
attain any Pareto-efficient allocation of its resources (where Pareto-efficiency is defined
with respect to resource feasibility constraints alone, and not incentiv'e constraints) as a
competitive equilibrium, so long as lump-sum transfers are feasible. Se e.g., I-Lu. R.
VARIAN, INTEPMEDiATE MicRoECoNoMICS: A MoDERN APRmo.Acn 517-19 ('th ed. 1996).
42

1020

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1003

In the life of the individual, choices in the past determine the set of
available choices in the present, and therefore influence what an individual actually chooses in the present, which in turn affects her future
choices. Anchoring this chain of choice and opportunity, at least as a
theoretical construct, are the "initial conditions" of individual choice,
and these are what we would ideally like to tax and subsidize. Why?
Because these characteristics fully identify the individual and because
they are immutable. That these characteristics identify the individual
means that we can precisely tailor our transfers to the well-being of
the agent from whom we are taking or to whom we are giving. That
these characteristics are immutable means that the individual cannot
distort her behavior to reduce the tax or increase the subsidy.
Unfortunately, many of the most relevant underlying immutable
characteristics are effectively unobservable to the policymaker. Even
if the policymaker could make a reliable list of what these relevant
characteristics are, and even if she had some sense of the population
distribution of each of these characteristics, she could not readily determine the relevant characteristics for any particularindividual in order to set her tax and transfer. Certainly, the policymaker cannot
depend on the individual herself to truthfully reveal her characteristics-to the extent that she even knows them herself-particularly
when the individual is also aware that what she tells the policymaker
will affect her tax bill.
For the most part, the policymaker has at her disposal only the
observable manifestations of the choices that individuals make based
upon their underlying characteristics. Thus, based on their preferences and endowments individuals decide how much to work, how
much of which goods to consume, and how much care to take in potentially hazardous activities. All that the policymaker sees is the individual's labor income, her spending on various goods and services,
46
and the amount of harm she has caused.
The optimal-tax literature proposes that we see these observable
manifestations as imperfect signals of individuals' underlying characteristics. They are signals because, through the vehicle of choice, they
are determined by and thus indicate individuals' underlying characteristics. They are imperfect because they "move" when they are
taxed: taxing or subsidizing income earned, consumption of particu-

46 More realistically, the policymaker sees only evidence of harm caused. For an analysis of the legal system that accounts for the fact that courts cannot directly observe varables like harm caused or care taken, see, for example, Chris William Sanchirico, Games,
Informationand Evidence Production:With Application to EnglishLegal Histoy, 2 AM. L. & EcoN.
REv. 342 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Relying on the Informationof Interested-andPoten.
tially Dishonest-Parties,3 Am. L. & ECON. REv. (forthcoming fall 2001).
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lar goods, or harm caused will typically cause tax-reducing or subsidyincreasing distortionary shifts in behavior.
The optimal-tax problem is the problem of making do with these
imperfect signals, and the question of which activities to tax becomes
the question of which signals to employ, and how much of each behavioral distortion to accept 47 This view of the problem has two implications. First, there is no a priori reason to favor one signal over
another; there is no reason why our indication of how much an individual chooses to earn on the labor market is any "better" a signal of
who that individual is than her choice of which car to drive, which
house to live in, or how careful to be in that house or car. Certainly,
the mere fact that one signal is labeled "income" and another "harm
caused" cannot be what drives the analysis.
Second, the sentiment that one signal is somehow better than another is not well formed analytically. By way of analogy, consider a
supplier producing a good who could use any combination of labor or
capital. Which factor of production is "better"? The question makes
no sense because a factor's efficacy of production depends on how
much it is used, both in absolute terms and relative to other factors. If
the factory is already full of machines, then the first few laborers are
highly effective. If the factory is already crowded with operators, an
additional laborer is unlikely to be productive.
The signals available for redistributional policy are factors in the
production of equity. The right question is not "which is best?" but
rather "what is the best combination?" No rule dictates that only one
signal can be chosen. Moreover, the efficacy of each given signal-in
terms of redistributional effectiveness and efficiency costs-is not
fixed like a weight or a height, but rather depends on use-its own
use and that of other tools.
B.

The Optimal-Tax Argument for Equity-Informed Legal
Rules48

To be sure, the bare fact that the structure of the problem does
not restrict us to a limited number of tools does not mean that the

solution to the problem will entail the use of all tools available. Yet,
47 But see Angus Deaton & Nicholas Stem, Optimally Uniform Commodity Taxs, Taste
Differences and Lump-Sum Grants, 20 ECON. La'rrERs 263 (1986); Nicholas Stem. Optimum

Taxes with Errorsin Administration, 17J. PUB. EcoN. 181 (1982). These papers assume that
some underlying characteristics can be directly observed independent of individnal actions, but that such observations are prone to error. They examine the trade-off between
direct observation of this kind and the form of individual choice-dependent signaling just
described. The vast majority of papers in the optimal-tax literature, however, adopt the
working assumption that relevant underlying characteristics are not at all directly observable to the policymaker.
48 The Technical Appendix § B.2 makes this argument formally.

1022

[Vol. 86:1003

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

this is in fact the answer one gets from a serious consideration of the
models that have heretofore been applied to the question of which
instruments to employ in our redistributive efforts. These models
teach us to spread our redistributional efforts among all available
tools, because every tool is initially perfectly redistributional, and no
tool remains perfect once employed.
The argument for distributionally informed legal rules follows

from the type of marginal analysis that characterizes basic economic
reasoning. The first step is to recognize that the efficient legal rule is
the one that maximizes total well-being, 49 or utility (without regard for
the distribution of well-being). In the simplest model of strict liability
with one-sided accidents, for instance, setting damages equal to harm
maximizes aggregate well-being.
"Maximizes" is the key word here, for maximization of aggregate
utility occurs in these sorts of models at a point where marginal aggregate utility with respect to the legal rule is precisely zero.r0 In other
words, if we are positioned at the efficient legal rule (if, for instance,
damages equal harm), then total utility can be neither in the process
of decreasing nor in the process of increasing as we start to move away
from efficiency in either direction. This is illustrated in the top panel
of the Figure.
Total Utility

Efficient Damages

A

1

Damages Rule

Inequality Measure

49

See supra note 42; Sanchirico, supranote 8, at 816 n.20.
Readers with some familiarity with economics will recall that a necessary condition
for an (interior) maximum of a (continuously differentiable) function is that the derivative
(slope) of the function be equal to zero at the candidate point. See, e.g., ALPiH C.CtiLNG,
FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL EcoNo.tcs 231-67 (3d ed. 1984).
50
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Certainly, total utility cannot increase in either direction, because
we are already at the total utility-maximizing point. But neither can it
decrease. In the majority of economic models, all functions, including total utility, are assumed to change smoothly with no kinks or
jumps.5 1 Given that total utility changes smoothly, were it to decrease
with marginal movements away from the optimum in one direction,
then it would have to increase with marginal movements in the opposite
direction. Once again, maximization would be contradicted. This is
not to say that total utility cannot eventually decrease as we move away
from the efficient point, just that it cannot be in the process ofdecreasing at precisely the total utility-maximizing point. Thus, as total utility
reaches its highest point, it will be, for at least an infinitely small moment, perfectly flat
The conclusion for our purposes, then, is that on the margin,
there is no "efficiency loss"-no loss to total utility-from shifting the
legal rule away from its efficient location, and this is the second step
in our argument. Certainly, if we move away from the efficient rule by
a discrete amount, we sacrifice efficiency. But the first infinitesimal
step, at least, involves no efficiency loss, and this alone tells us something about whether some discrete step is worth taking.
But while efficient rules maximize total utility, they have no special status with respect to inequality. Short of enormous coincidence
(or a built-in assumption that legal rules have no equity effects), there
is no reason to believe that the inequality margin is zeroed-out at the
efficient legal rule. Thus, as in the example in the bottom panel of
the Figure, the curve depicting the appropriate measure of inequality
will not generally flatten out in the same way as the total utility curve
at the efficient legal rule. If, for instance, changing tort damages affects different people differently, this will almost certainly have some
marginal impact on the relevant measure of inequality"-the chance
is essentially nil that the differential impact will be precisely such that
the relevant inequality measure remains constant. Moreover, one direction of change will be equity increasing. If, as in the Figure, the
marginal impact of increasing damages is to increase inequality, then
decreasing damages will have the opposite effect and will enhance
equality.
Thus, on the margin, movements away from the efficient legal
rule have no impact on total utility, but-if we move in the right direc51 See infra note 56 for a discussion of how results would change without this
assumption.
52
The choice of a social-welfare function implies the choice of an inequality measure.
For instance, if the social-welfare-weighting function is quadratic, the relevant measure of
inequality is the variance. The discussion in the Technical Appendix § B.2 provides more
detail.
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tion-a beneficial impact on inequality. The existence of such marginally improving movements implies the existence of discrete
adjustments for which the equity gains outweigh the efficiency losses.
Since the marginal efficiency loss is truly nil, this holds no matter how
little weight we place on equity as compared to efficiency-so long as
that weight is not actually zero-and no matter how small the distributional effects of the legal rule change-so long as these effects are not
completely absent. Of course, we cannot say how large the discrete
adjustments will be, only that they will always exist. Their size will depend on how quickly efficiency declines relative to inequality and how
we weight each in our notion of social welfare.
It may help to explore these ideas in the context of a more concrete example. Suppose that there are only two people in the economy, one of whom is more well-off than the other. Start at the
efficient level of damages-damages equal to harm-and imagine a
marginal (i.e., infinitesimal) increase in damages above their efficient
level.
One theoretical possibility is that this increase will affect both
agents by precisely the same amount and in the same way. Unless
enforced by a flank of assumptions ensuring that the two agents are
identical in their interactions with the tort system, this is a negligible
contingency.
Thus, in general, increasing the level of damages will affect the
two agents differently. But the fact that we make our adjustment starting from efficient damages says a surprising amount about the nature
of this differential impact. Specifically, a marginal increase of damages above harm must help one agent and hurt the other-in fact, it
must help one agent by precisely the same amount that it hurts the
other.
The best way to understand this relationship is to rule out all
other possibilities. In the easiest case, increasing damages above harm
(on the margin) cannot help both agents simultaneously. If it did, the
sum of the agents' utilities would increase and this would contradict
the fact that our starting point is the efficient level of damages, the
level maximizing total utility.
For symmetric reasons, increasing damages cannot simultaneously hurt both agents. If it did, then the opposite adjustment, decreasing damages, would increase the sum of the agents' utilities and
contradict the supposition that damages are initially efficient. Again,
this relies on the standard assumption that individual utility, and so
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also the sum of individual utilities, do not change direction
discontinuously.5 3
Having ruled out both simultaneous detriment and simultaneous
benefit, we may then conclude that one agent is hurt and the other
helped by the increase in damages. It is then not too large a step to
realize that the degree to which one agent benefits must equal the
amount by which the other is hurt. If increasing damages above harm
helps one agent more than it hurts the other, then increasing damages increases the sum of utilities, contradicting the principle that
damages set equal to harm are efficient. Symmetrically, if increasing
damages above harm helps one agent less than it helps the other, then
the opposite adjustment, decreasing damages below harm, would (impossibly) enhance efficiency.
Therefore, increasing damages on the efficient damages margin
helps one agent by the same amount that it hurts the other. A symmetric analysis would show that decreasing damages below harm
would have the same effect, except that the agents' roles would be
reversed.
We may thus reach two important conclusions based on the foregoing analysis. First, any marginal adjustment to damages away from
their efficient level has no effect on the sum of the agents' utilities.
Because one agent gains by the exact amount that the other loses, the
adjustment constitutes, on the margin, a pure transfer of utility from
one agent to the other without any leakage in the bucket. Second,
since what has just been said applies to adjustment in both directions,
and because these two adjustments have an opposite effect on each
agent, one of these two directions will necessarily effect a pure transfer
from the more well-off agent to the less well-off agent. Thus, moving
in whichever direction effects such a transfer will produce a marginal
decrease in inequality with no associated loss in aggregate utility.
It is a fascinating consequence of the standard structure of this
analytical framework-which itself is based on the general impossibility of perfect transfers54-that in the immediate neighborhood of efficient legal rules, pure and perfect transfers of well-being between
agents become possible. Adjustments to damages starting from any
other position will have real efficiency consequences, and there is no
reason to believe that the direction of efficiency increase will correspond to the direction of greater equality. Thus, the trade-off between equity and efficiency is a very real concern everywhere-except
at the margins of the perfectly efficient point.
53

For a discussion of what can still be said without the assumption that finctions are

smooth, see infra note 56.
54 See supra Part f..
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The real economy, of course, includes more than two people.
But the same argument applies no matter how many participants are
involved. Marginally increasing damages above their efficient level affects different agents differently: some gain and some lose, but on the
whole the gains and losses cancel out. The fact that gains cancel
losses means that there is no efficiency loss on the margin. The fact
that different individuals are affected differently ensures that one direction of adjustment will be equity enhancing. With more than two
individuals, it is theoretically possible that the particular pattern of
gains and losses will be such that the relevant measure of inequality
remains constant. For example, there are ways to adjust the points in
a distribution up and down (with no net change in the total) and yet
not affect the distribution's standard deviation. 5 But these instances
are not easy to find; unless one is specifically aiming for them, as an
inanimate economy never would, they are essentially impossible to
stumble upon. Our conclusion thus continues to hold however large
the population: starting from the efficient point, it will be possible to
effect a reduction in economic inequality with no loss to efficiency. At
the efficient margin, there is no equity-efficiency trade-off. 6
55 Technically, we just take the derivative of the standard deviation with respect to all
points, subject to the constraint that the adjustments add up to zero, and set this derivative
to zero.
56 The argument that damages should always be adjusted away from the efficient standard depends on the assumption that the relevant functions are continuously differentiable. See, e.g., CHIANG, supra note 50, at 307. In particular, it rests on the assumption that
the sum of individual (indirect) utilities as a function of the damages rule does not reach
its peak at a kink (with respect to the damages rule), but rather is momentarily flat at the
top. See id. at 147-48, 240 n.* (providing formal definitions of "continuity" and "continuous differentability").
The standard assumption that functions are "smooth" is not based on empirical confirmation, but nonetheless allows for use of the calculus in characterizing maximum points.
In fact, real functional relationships are never ideally smooth. It is thus worth considering
the consequences of relaxing this assumption.

Suppose that total utility, as a function of the damages rule, happened to reacll Its
maximum at a sharp peak. In this case, moving away from efficient damages in either
direction would indeed result in a discrete efficiency loss on the margin. As we have already noted, one direction of movement would also result in a discrete equity gain on the
margin, and the question would then be whether the gain outweighed the corresponding
efficiency loss. If so, the conclusion that legal rules should always be altered for distributional purposes would continue to hold. But if not, it does not follow that the legal rule
should be efficient. Even though a small movement away from efficiency might not be
warranted, we could not necessarily conclude that a largemovement would not be welfare
enhancing.
All told, allowing for kinks weakens the conclusion reached in this Part from "more
than opposite" to merely opposite of the new rationale's conclusion. If kinks are allowed,
it would no longer be true that legal rules should always be adjusted away from efficient
standards, but the new rationale's assertion that legal rules should always be set efficiently
would still be false.
Indeed, allowing for kinks might also work against the redistributional efficacy of the
income tax. Certainly, if we are willing to entertain the possibility of peaks in total utility as
a function of the damages rule, we must also be willing to entertain the same possibility
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The Optimality of Conditioning Legal Rules on Parties'
Incomes

The proposition that legal rules should be distributionally informed raises the question of how best to do so. Given the prominence of the double-distortion argument, the issue of whether legal

rules should be specifically conditioned on parties' incomes (or on
other taxable attributes) is of particular interest.
The question of whether damages, for instance, should be conditioned on income, wealth, or consumption is part of the larger issue
of whether optimal "tax rates," broadly defined, should be cross-dependent. The general cross-dependence issue can be illustrated as
follows. We observe for each individual a number of different attributes. These include labor income, interest income, financial wealth,
consumption of various goods, and damages caused in accidents.
Theoretically, we could impose a charge on each individual (which we
shall refer to as a "tax") based on the full list of her observable characteristics. In other words, we could institute a multidimensional "tax"
table, such that each individual would determine her level of taxation
by looking up not just her income but also consumption, damages
caused, and the like. Of course, in conceiving of and codifying the
multidimensional tax, we are free to parse the total tax bill into components corresponding to some or all observable characteristics, calling one portion the "income tax" and another the "damages
schedule," for instance.
A more familiar option is to have a set of separate tax tables for
income, wealth, and harm caused. The individual would look up her
income in one table to find her income tax, her wealth in another
table to find her wealth tax, and so forth. She would then add all
these taxes together to calculate her total "tax bill."
Establishing separate tax tables for each taxable attribute is a special case of the multidimensional tax table. Any tax structure comprised of a set of separate tax tables can always be expressed by one
multidimensional table. In the cell of the multidimensional table representing the tax for each given vector of observable characteristics, we
simply place the sum of the taxes located in the appropriate cells of
each of the separate tax tables.
with respect to the income tax. Thus, it may be that the kinks in the income tax are such
that the tax should be set purely on the basis of efficiency.
Indeed, potential kinks in the income tax may actually increase the benefits of deviating from efficiency in setting legal rules. Setting the income tax purely on the basis of
efficiency may intensify the redistributional impact of adjusting rules in other areas away
from their efficient levels. Plausibly, the marginal social-welfare benefits of redistribution
(by any means) diminish as more redistribution is accomplished. It would then be rore
likely that the redistributional benefit of the rule adjustment would ovenhelm any discrete
efficiency loss.
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Conversely, stating the total tax bill in separate tax tables imposes
a genuine restriction on the sort of tax structures available for social
choice. With a multidimensional tax table it is possible to make the
individual's tax on each attribute-however we choose to distinguish
this component tax from the whole-a function of the levels of the
individual's other attributes. Taxes can thus be cross-dependent. Income tax rates, for instance, can be based on wealth, just as damages
might depend on the individual's income or wealth. In contrast, if we
insist on having a different schedule for each attribute, then the tax
on one attribute cannot turn on the level of any other. The marginal
tax rate on income, for example, can depend only on the individual's
level of income and not on her level of consumption or wealth. Similarly, the level of damages cannot be made a function of income or
wealth.
The general question, then, is whether restricting taxes to be
"separable," rather than allowing for the more general case of crossdependence, sacrifices optimality. The particular question for us is
whether the effect on one's total tax bill of an increase in harm caused
should depend on other factors, such as one's income, wealth, or
consumption.
The general cross-dependence question has received surprisingly
little attention, even in the large body of formal literature on optimal
taxation. Nevertheless, Mirrlees treats the issue briefly: He notes that
in any realistic setting, social welfare can be improved by allowing
some degree of cross-dependence in the tax system.5 7 In other words,
social welfare is sacrificed by insisting on separability. Thus, in reference to our particular question, the social-welfare-maximizing damages rule, will, in general, depend on the income of the parties, as well
as on their other observable attributes.
Though the precise argument as to why cross-dependence is optimal is fairly technical, the general idea is quite intuitive. As noted
above, the defining problem of optimal taxation is the inability of the
government to tailor its taxation policies to the underlying immutable
characteristics of each particular individual. Therefore, governments
are forced to base taxes on the observable by-products of individual
choice rather than on the hidden characteristics that inform those
choices. An extension of this logic dictates that in so setting tax rates,
the more we are able to tailor these rates to the particular underlying
characteristics of the individual, the greater the social welfare that we
can attain. Making tax rates cross-dependent is beneficial precisely
57 SeeJ.A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theoy: A Synthesis, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 327, 344 (1976)
(noting in passing that when individuals differ along more than one dimension, "some
cross-dependence is generally necessary for optimality").
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because it allows us to further personalize the application of the tax
system.
Consider two individuals with different characteristics, each deciding whether to earn the 30,001st dollar. Under a separable tax systern, both individuals will face the same marginal tax rate on this next
dollar regardless of the fact that they may have different labor supply
elasticities and different levels of overall well-being. Under a crossdependent tax system, however, the marginal tax rate for each of
these individuals can be partly tailored to their particular characteristics. Suppose, for example, that relevant underlying differences
among individuals influence consumption patterns and that we understand the operative statistical associations between observed consumption and these unobserved characteristics. Then we can partially
tailor the individuals' marginal income-tax rates to their unique characteristics by making that marginal tax rate dependent on their consumption patterns.
Generally speaking, two individuals with the same income may
exhibit differences that would lead society to want to tax their incomes differently if those differences were known. Observing other
characteristics, such as consumption patterns, is a method by which
society can learn more about these differences. Basing the marginal
income tax on these observations is a way to use what we learn.
Why not try to separate these two individuals by adjusting a separate consumption tax rather than making the income tax depend on
consumption?5 8 The answer is that the cross-dependent solution is
more precise. Adjustments to a separate consumption tax will affect
all individuals with the same consumption pattern, including those
whose incomes differ from that of our two individuals. On the other
hand, consumption-delimited adjustments to the income-tax rate at
the $30,001 level will have an impact more narrowly focused on the
task of separating the two individuals in our example. Adjusting this
income tax rate only for those who consume at a $20,000 level, for
instance, affects the intersection of the set of individuals at this earnings margin and the set of individuals at this consumption level. A
separate adjustment to each tax affects the larger union of those two
sets.
Two potential caveats to the general optimality of cross-dependence should be mentioned. The first concerns the objection that
cross-dependence is complex and difficult to implement in practice.
Before addressing this objection on its own terms, it is important
to point out that the double-distortion argument against cross-dependence in damages rules makes no reference to complexity. The asser58

I thank Benjamin Cohen for raising this question.
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tion, rather, is that this particular form of cross-dependence is
suboptimal by canonical optimal-tax logic, which does not incorporate
considerations of complexity.
In any event, the complexity point seems inapplicable to the spe-

cific instance of conditioning damages on income or wealth. Incometax records or bank statements could certainly be produced along
with evidence of the accident. Indeed, in many states, punitive damages are already a function of the defendant's wealth.5 9 To be sure,
the object of this policy is usually to calibrate the severity of punishment rather than to redistribute. 60 And there are certainly those who
oppose such conditioning on other grounds. 61 But no opponent
points to its complexity.
Indeed, the ubiquity of all types of cross-dependence calls into
question the argument that cross-dependence is prohibitively complex. The "income tax," for instance, is a complicated function of
many observable characteristics, not all of which can be rationalized as
attempts to define "income." Through the effects of exemptions, deductions, and progressivity, one's marginal income-tax rate at various
levels may depend on many things besides the accretion of wealth. A
short list would include income source (capital gains versus wage and
salary income), marital status, the size of an individual's family (the
number of dependents), current liquidity needs (which may require
the individual to realize gains), mode of housing (given the mortgage
subsidy), and mode of employment (in terms of whether it involves
tax-deductible expenses).62
A second potential qualification to the optimality of cross-dependence is that optimal-tax analysis may call for adjustments to legal
rules that are counterintuitive 63 (perhaps even as counterintuitive as
some of the cross-dependencies we see in practice). For instance, one
could construct models in which, at least over some ranges, optimal
damages would decrease with added income. These would be models
59 In thirty-seven states, the trier of fact may consider the defendant's wealth as a
factor in assessing punitive damages, and in six states, the trier of fact must consider the
defendant's wealth. Annotation, PunitiveDamages:Relationshipto Defendant's Wealth as Factor
in DeterminingProprieyof Award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141, §§ 3, 4 (1991). For example, in California both the judiciary and the legislature have addressed this issue and concluded that
taking defendants' wealth into account is appropriate. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3294-95
(West 1997); Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991). According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the trier of fact may consider a defendant's wealth when assessing punitive
damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1965).
60
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) cmt. e (1965).
61 See, e.g., Abraham & Jeffries, supra note 31 (arguing that conditioning punitive
damages on a defendant's wealth encourages jury prejudice and is inconsistent with the
purposes of tort law).
62
See, e.g., Bouas I. BKrrER & MARTINJ. MCMAHON,JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDVIDUALS
2.2, 2.3, 8.2, 10.1, 10.2, 22.2 (2d ed. 1995).
63
See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 681.
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in which the tort system was relatively effective at establishing work
incentives while other sectors were relatively effective at redistributing
economic well-being. In such models it would be optimal to intensify
redistribution in other sectors of the economy while counteracting
the deleterious effect on work incentives by rewarding those with
higher income by lowering their damages. However improbable these
types of models are, to advocate cross-dependence is not necessarily to
advocate making those with higher income pay more in damages.
This second qualification is a warning against viewing redistributional efforts in the tort system myopically, instead of in the context of
a broader redistributional policy; it is an argument against unthinking
cross-dependence. But it is not an argument against cross-dependence per se. In this respect, this qualification does nothing to bolster

the blanket assertion of double-distortion reasoning that conditioning
damages on income is categorically suboptimal as a matter of economic logic.
Moreover, if we are to make the possibility of counterintuitive optima a criterion for avoiding use of certain policy instruments, the income tax is no less vulnerable than the tort system. As discussed in
Part IV.A, the optimally redistributive income tax need not be
progressive.64
m
OBJE TIONS, POTENTIAL AND AcrAL

This Part responds to a number of objections to the foregoing

argument for equity-informed legal rules. Several of these objections
appeared in published form as a response to an earlier version of the
argument in Part 11.65
A.

The Fuzzy Rhetoric of "Redistributing Income"

Scholars employ the phrase "redistributing income" in at least
three different contexts. Confusion among these meanings often redounds to the rhetorical advantage of the new efficiency rationale. A
critical appraisal of the new rationale thus requires some careful
deconstruction.
The phrase "redistributing income" may express a policy goal,
namely, to reduce inequality in the distribution of income, as opposed

to wealth, well-being, or some other target. The new rationale may

well benefit from the impression that a tax on income is the most
natural way to reduce inequality in the distribution of dollar incomes.
But whatever the validity of this impression, proponents of the new
64
65

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 8 (critiquing Sanchirico, .supranote 8).
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rationale do not propose targeting the distribution of income. Quite
rightly, they advocate casting distributional goals in terms of broader
concepts of well-being-concepts that, unlike income, account for
consumption from savings and the disutility of work. Thus, the new
rationale's double-distortion argument purports to show how the
same distribution of well-being can be achieved at lower cost if redistribution is accomplished solely through the income tax. 6" Moreover,

mathematical models of the new rationale posit the equalization of
individual utility, not income, as the ultimate goal of redistributive
67

policy.

The phrase "redistributing income" is also used in connection
with assertions about the proper medium of transfer. Apart from the
issue of whether and how much to transfer from person A to person B
is the issue of what should physically pass between the two. Should A
be compelled to buy chocolates for B? Should A allow B to live in her
home? Should we tax A, purchase food and clothing, and then give
these to B? More generally, should the transfer be in cash or in kind?
In this context, the phrase "redistributing income" refers to the generally accepted principle that transfers should be made in the form of
currency.68 If we give B more cash, she can use the cash to purchase
the goods and services that she values most highly. On the other
hand, if we purchase for her a nontradable good that she would not
herself have purchased with the same amount of cash, then we waste
the difference in value between this good and her most highly valued
69
use of the money.

The new rationale, with its emphasis on redistributing by income
tax, probably benefits from homonymic association with this fairly uncontroversial principle. Yet the association is fallacious. The new rationale is a statement about how transfers should be determined, not
how they should be physically effected. The new rationale tells us that
we should set the amount of the transfer solely on the basis of the

66 See Kaplow &Shavell, supra note 6, at 668 (concluding that if redistribution were
confined to the income tax, "all individuals could be made better off"); see also supra Part I
(discussing the double-distortion argument).
67 See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 6, at 677 (specifying in equation (Al) that individual utility is a function of leisure, consumption, and how well the individual fares in the
tort system); id. at 679 (indicating that individuals' utility is the policy target),
68 See, e.g., WILujAmJ. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLI'
435 (8th ed. 2000). A more general statement of the principle is that the transfer should
be made in a form that is easily tradable. Paternalistic caveats to the general principle arise
in special circumstances. See id. at 396. For example, we may not wish to give cash to an
addict.
69 More generally, if we give the individual a good that can only be traded at a discount, we lose the lesser of the difference in value and the trading discount.
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individual's income, 70 ignoring any other indications of the indiidual's position in the economy. That a transfer is made ith cash says
nothing about how the transfer was determined. We could transfer
cash on the basis of eye color. Conversely, we could transfer chocolates on the basis of wage and interest earnings.
More plausibly, one could determine how much to transfer on an
eclectic basis and then effect the transfer entirely through adjustments in the "income tax." Adjusting the income tax is one way to
effectively transfer currency. There would then be a sense in which
"only the income tax is being used to redistribute." But this is not
what the new rationale has in mind. The new rationale advocates determining the transfer solely on the basis of the individual's income.
Whether the transfer is actually effected solely through adjustments in
the income tax is not the point in controversy.
For instance, an equity-motivated adjustment to the tort damages
rule that forces injurers to pay harm caused plus $1,000 could certainly be effected by adjusting the income tax. We would increase injurers' "tax liability" by $1,000 and decrease victims' tax liability by the
same (allowing a refundable credit). Effecting the transfer through
the income tax is just a matter of relabeling, and perhaps rescheduling, a liability payment that is already being made in terms of currency. But, although this plan uses only the income tax in effecting
the transfer, it does not use only income in determining how large
that transfer should be. Hence, it violates the prescription of the new
rationale.

Thus, when assessing new-rationale articles wi itles like "%hy
the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,"71 it is important to understand that the authors are not
actually targeting income per se. Neither is their argument an assertion about the form in which transfers should be made. Rather, these
70 It is unclear to what extent the new efficiency rationale applies to other conventionally taxable attributes besides income. For wealth taxes and taxes on annual consumption expenditure, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 679 n.22:
For convenience, we examine the distribution of income with an income
tax as the redistributive tool. In a dynamic analysis, one might wish to distinguish the distribution of consumption or wealth from the distribution of
income (and consider consumption or wealth taxes in addition to an income tax), which would raise the issue of distorting savings. One can think
of the labor-leisure distortion as exemplif)ing any distortion that results
from a general redistributive tax.
Id.For individual commodity taxes and estate and gift taxes, see id. at 679-80 and sources
cited infra notes 147-49.
71
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6 (emphasis added). Consider, as well, the title
"Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifling the Role of Legal Rules and the Income
Tax in RedistributingIncom&" Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8 (emphasis added). Both of
these articles contain numerous references to "redistributing income." Cf supra notes 66-
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authors are arguing that in attempting to reduce inequality in overall
well-being, only certain conventionally taxable attributes should be considered in determining how much to transfer among individuals.
B.

The Perverse-Outcomes Bugbear

Kaplow and Shavell put forward the following parable in response
to an earlier version of the argument asserted in Part II.B. 7 2 Imagine,
they say, that the income-rich own yachts, while the income-poor own
73
fishing boats, and that yachts and fishing boats sometimes collide.
Imagine further that yacht owners, because they are relatively "klutzy,"
cause more accidents than fishing-boat owners.74 Because rich yacht
owners tend to pay damages more often than they receive them, they
fare worse than poor fishing-boat owners within the confines of the
75
tort system governing boating accidents.
Kaplow and Shavell assert that under the analysis laid out in Part
II, the proper equity adjustment to the damages rule governing boating accidents would be to lower damages to help the klutzy, yet rich,
yacht owners at the expense of the well-coordinated, but nonetheless
poor, fishing-boat owners. 76 Arguing that this result is absurd, they
suggest that the general analysis that produces it-that is, the analysis
in Part II.B-must follow suit.
But Kaplow and Shavell are incorrect about how the analysis in
Part II.B would apply to their boating example. According to that
analysis legal rules should be adjusted away from efficient standards in
a manner that helps those who are less well-off. It is crucial to note
that, in determining who these less well-off are, the analysis directs us
to consider all aspects of individuals' economic lives, notjust the regulatory sphere of the legal rule. Less well-off means less well-off oveall 77 And overall well-being includes the utility or disutility derived
not only from the portion of the legal system whose rules we are ad-

72
See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 8, at 822; see also id. at 825-26 (making the same
point again in more general terms).
73
See id. at 822.
74 See id. at 822, 828.
75
See id. at 822.
76 Id. at 829, 831 (arguing that "Sanchirico's argument [is] that the legal rule should
be adjusted to favor rich yacht owners and disfavor low-income fishermen" and that
Sanchirico['s] "'equity' adjustment favors the group in which klutziness is more
prevalent").
77 This point is made in several places in Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 797, to which
Kaplow and Shavell respond. See, e.g., id.at 807-08, 817-18 (in particular equation (4)), 819
(in particular equation (5)), 819-20 (in particular Part I.D), 820 (in particular Part 1V,
end of first paragraph).
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justing, but also from labor markets, goods markets, and other segments of the private law.78
Thus, in determining how to adjust a particular rule for an equity
purpose, we look well beyond inequality arising within the particular
rule's regulatory ambit. The optimal equity-motivated adjustment to
each individual legal rule is intended to be part of a unified economywide movement of resources from those who are more well-off overall
79
to those who are less well-off overal
The fact that the proper equity adjustment to legal rules is determined on the basis of overall well-being, of which well-being within
the legal system is but one part, implies that the proper adjustment to
a given rule may actually move against those who are less well-off
within the limited sphere in which that legal rule operates. Just as the
student with the best overall exam might not have the best score on
each question, the proper adjustment to tort rules may actually favor
those who do relatively well within the narrow confines of the tort
system. This will happen if individuals' "tort system well-being" is negatively correlated with their overall well-being. In this case, helping
those who are less well-off overall happens to mean adopting a policy
that tends to favor those who are more well-off within the tort system. 8°
Another implication of keying equity adjustments to overall wellbeing is that if one segment of the economy dominates in the determination of overall well-being, then this segment will dictate the equity
adjustment to all legal rules and taxes. Thus, if income were the dominant indicator of overall well-being, being income-poor would be
closely identified with being less well-off overall, and, accordingly, the
proper equity adjustment to all legal rules would tend to help the
poor.
Kaplow and Shavell are apparently (and plausibly) assuming that
the income-rich yacht owners are better-off overall, despite their
klutziness at the helm.8 ' But if the rich yacht owners are better-off
78 In general, it is not even entirely dear how to divide overall utility among the various spheres of economic and legal activity. This happens to be a simple task in Kaplow and
Shavell's model because they separate utility additively across these different areas. &re
infra Part VA2(b). It is also, apparently, possible in Kaplow and Shavell's fishing parable.
For the remainder of this discussion, this Article will assume arguendo that it is possible to
identify inequality within the regulatory ambit of a given legal rule.
79
More precisely, the proper adjustment is in a direction that helps the less well-off

on average. Some of the less well-off overall will be helped, but some will not be; on average, however, the proper adjustment will improve their position. That adjustments to legal

rules will not necessarily help every less well-off individual is an inevitable feature of any
redistributional policy, including the redistributive income tax. Part IVB discusses the significance of this inevitable "error" more fully.
80 Section B.1 of the Technical Appendix formally establishes the arguments in the

last two paragraphs.
81 To be sure, we cannot be certain from their text that Kaplow and Shavell intend to
assume that income is dominant in well-being. They do not say as much. However, iith-
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overall, then Kaplow and Shavell have it backwards. Under the analysis in Part II.B, the equity adjustment to the tort system should favor
82
the poor fishing-boat owners, and not the rich yacht owners.
Given the confusion over this issue, it may be worth reiterating
the main point. The proper equity adjustment to a given legal rule
will always favor those who are worse off overall. Will it specifically
favor the income-poor? Yes, if helping the less well-off overall is more
or less the same as helping the income-poor-which is to say, yes, if
having little income is highly correlated with being less well-off overall. The answer would be no if those who are less well-off overall do
not tend to be income-poor (perhaps the well-off consume mostly out
of dissavings from principal that was originally received as
inheritance).
Will the adjustment favor those who fare worse within the tort
system? The same conditional answer applies: Yes, if helping the less
well-off overall is the same as helping those who are less well-off in
tort. No, if not. Importantly, we give no special consideration to how
individuals happen to fare within the sphere regulated by a particular
rule in determining the proper redistributional adjustment to that
rule. In particular, how individuals fare within the system governing
boating accidents receives no special treatment in determining the
proper adjustment to boating damages.
C.

The "Cross-Effects" Red Herring

An obvious and acceptable precondition for the optimality of equity-informed legal rules is that individuals are not all perfectly alike
in their interaction with the legal system. If everyone were affected in
precisely the same way by adjustments to a given rule, then changing
the rule would change only the size of the pie and not the distribution
of its proportions.
From a theoretical perspective, all observable differences between individuals ultimately derive from differences in their underlying immutable characteristics: their genetic ability, their inheritance
(intangible and tangible), and their preferences. There are essenout this assumption, their example loses its rhetorical force. Helping the income-rich at
the expense of the income-poor would be no indictment if the income-rich were somehow
worse off than the income-poor.
82
Later in the fishing-boat example, Kaplow and Shavell declare that the best way to
help the poor fishermen is to leave the tort rule efficient and make the income tax more
redistributive. This plainly begs the question. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 823.
The article to which Kaplow and Shavell respond provides an example that is similar
to the fishing-boat example, in which it is clearly noted that the proper equity adjustment
to the tort system would favor the poor even though they happen to be better-off in tort.
See Sanchirico, supranote 8, at 802, 804-05 (arguing that the proposed adjustment to damages hurts the less well-off in tort in order to help the income-poor, who are assumed to be
less well-off overall); id. at 807, 819-20 (especially equation (5)).
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tially two avenues by which such underlying differences manifest
themselves in the legal system.8 3 An individual's underlying characteristics may either directly or indirectly affect observable legal behavior
and outcomes.
The direct impact is straightforward. The choice problems that
individuals face within a given legal sphere may differ depending on a
variety of underlying circumstances that determine how the legal system affects their particular lives. For example, the yacht owners are
klutzier than the fishing-boat owners in Kaplow and Shavell's parable.
More generally, one may posit that individuals differ in "genetic ability" and that these differences directly affect not just job productivity,
but also the efficacy and efficiency of their precautionary behavior.
The indirect impact of underlying characteristics on legal-system
behavior is somewhat more obscure. To some extent, differences in
legal behavior derive solely from differences in behavior in other
spheres, such as the labor market. Thus, even if two individuals face
precisely the same underlying circumstances in their interaction ith
the tort system, their different choices in the labor market may exert
cross-effects that cause different behaviors in the tort sphere. In particular, even in an artificial world in which individuals differ
parametrically only in their labor productivity, we can generally expect to see resulting differences in labor-leisure choice reflected in
the legal sphere. For example, the fact that yacht owners have more
income than fishing-boat owners may affect the way that they operate
their boats over and above their underlying differences in klutziness.
Poor fishing-boat owners may be less careful because they use their
boats out of necessity and not for leisure, and because their livelihoods depend on the quantity of fish they can catch per unit time.
Even though there are two sources of legal heterogeneity, some
commentators implicitly encourage the reader to think that the latter
avenue, indirect cross-effects with labor-leisure choice, is the only avenue by which individuals can differ in their interaction with the legal
system. Consider, for example, the section on "qualifications" in the
technical appendix to Kaplow and Shavell's original presentation of
the new efficiency rationale.8 4 This section constitutes Kaplow and
Shavell's full qualification of their pure-efficiency result in that article.8 5 Because there is some dispute about whether Kaplow and

83

Importantly, precisely the same two avenues create the differences necessary to

drive the redistributional impact of any policy instrument, including the income tax.

See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 680-81.
In the main text of their article, Kaplow and Shavell also discuss accounting for the
victim's wealth in order to determine the extent of the harm. See id. at 675-76. This, how84
85

ever, is an efficiency issue, not an equity issue, as Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge. See id.
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Shavell's qualifications were adequate,8 6 the section in question is reproduced here in its entirety (with the exception of one irrelevant
footnote):
(c) Qualificationsand the relationshipbetween our result and those in the
literature on optimal taxation. Our result is analogous to results on

optimal taxation. In simple cases, specific commodity excises are
inefficient in the presence of an optimal income tax. This conclusion does not hold generally, however, because taxes or subsidies on
particularcommodities might have indirect effects that reduce the distortion
of an income tax. In particular, by taxing complements of leisure and by
subsidizing substitutes, one can reduce the labor-leisure distortion and

thereby improve welfare by more than the inefficiency that results
from distorted purchases of the taxed or subsidized commodities.
Analogously, if there were legal disputes involving activities that were
strong complements of or substitutes for leisure, one might select rules that
provided additionalpenalties or subsidies relative to what an efficient rule

would involve. (As the excise tax discussion [in the prior section]
suggests, however, this would be the most efficient choice only if
taxes or subsidies on the activities themselves were infeasible.) Such
penalties and subsidies, however, are not conventionally redistributive: whether an activity should be penalized or subsidized depends on how
the activity affects the labor-leisurechoice, not on whether it is undertaken disproportionately by the rich. Thus, although a complete
and sophisticated analysis does not demonstrate that it could never
be efficient to change legal rules from what narrowly seem to be the
most efficient ones, there is no general argument for adjustments of
a conventionally redistributive type. [Footnote 26 appears here. Its
full text is: "For discussion of other qualifications, see Kaplow, supra
note 3.-87]88
The argument is difficult to follow. But it is at least clear from the
repeated mention of indirect effects, substitutes, and complements
that the topic is cross-effects. It is also clear that the authors make no
explicit mention of their additional assumption that legal heterogeneity does not arise directly, and that individuals' underlying differences
have a direct effect only on how much they choose to work.

86

See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 8, at 825-27 (asserting that their original results

were sufficiently qualified).
87 This citation refers to Kaplow's discussion of direct heterogeneity in another paper,
See Louis KAPLOW, SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT'S ALLOCATION BRANCH BE CONCERNED Auotri
THE DIsToRTIoNARY CosT OF TAXATION AND DISTRIBUTsW EFFErs? (Harvard Law School

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 137, 1993)
[hereinafter KAPLOW, ALLoCATIoN BRANCH], revised version published as Louis Kaplow, The
Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT'L TAN J. 513

(1996) [hereinafter Kaplow, Optimal Supply]. Part II.D explains why even this discussion is
inadequate.
88 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 680-81 (emphasis added) (footnote 25 omitted).
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The rhetorical effect of this selective qualification seems similarly
apparent. The generalist reader, who may have only a vague understanding of how cross-effects function, is reassured that the optimality
of tax-only redistribution is robust, except for second-order esoterica
which appear to have something to do with "substitutability" and
"complementarity." Passing unnoticed is the important point that
even if cross-effects were entirely absent, legal heterogeneity would
still remain by virtue of the underlying individual differences that go
directly to individuals' interaction with the legal system. The argument for equity-informed legal rules holds even if cross-effects are assumed away.8 9
D.

Inside the Matryoshka Doll: The "Within-Income-Group
Differences" Fallacy

As is evident from the excerpt quoted above, Kaplow and Shavell
also "qualify" their original pure-efficiency result by citing to a section
in a working paper by one of the authors. According to Kaplow and
Shavell, we are to treat this citation as their bow to the direct creation
of legal heterogeneity.90
Given that this citation appears in a footnote to their technical
appendix9 ' and refers to "other qualifications" discussed in this working paper without clarifying what these might be,92 one could certainly question whether such an oblique reference constitutes
adequate "qualification" for the purpose of scholarly discourse. Yet,
even if the relevant content of the cited working paper were included
verbatim in the body of Kaplow and Shavell's article, that article's account of the assumptions necessary for pure efficiency would still be
inadequate.
The working paper cited by Kaplow and Shavell portrays the assumption necessary for pure efficiency not as the complete absence of
legal heterogeneity, but as the absence of legal heterogeneity "within
income groups." 93 The implication is that the pure-efficiency result is
impervious to the introduction of legal heterogeneity so long as individuals with the same income are also homogeneous with respect to
their interaction with the legal system.
89
90

91

See section B.2 of the Technical Appendix for a formal proof of this mertion.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 827.
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 681 n.26 (citing KMLow, ALLOt1%T1iO'

BRA cH, supra note 87).
92
93

Id.
Indeed, the title of the only subsection in this working paper that handles ex-in-

Kxwtow, AL~ocv.
come heterogeneity is "Variation in Incidence l17thin Income Clmss"
TION B _cH, supra note 87, at 15 (emphasis added). The published version of this
working paper displays the same emphasis. See Kaplow, Optimal Suppky; supra note 87.
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There are two problems with this attempt to limit the equity role
of legal rules. First, the assertion is incorrect. Even if there were no
"within-income-group differences," that is, even if everyone at a given
income level were precisely the same in every other respect, legal rules
4
would still have an equity roleY

Individual differences in the legal sphere may be parallel to differences in income. Therefore, legal heterogeneity can exist even
though all individuals within a given income group are also identical

from the perspective of the legal system. Consider, for example, a
revision of Kaplow and Shavell's fishing-boat parable, in which fishingboat owners are income-poor and now also klutzy, while yacht owners
are income-rich and well coordinated. Let us also assume that fishingboat owners all have the same low level of income and the same degree of klutziness and that yacht owners all have the same high level of
income and the same degree of coordination. This assumption eradicates within-income-group differences. Even so, there is still significant legal heterogeneity.
As long as legal heterogeneity of any kind exists, even if it is perfectly parallel to differences in income, the rationale for including
tort rules in redistributional policy still applies. Were we redistributing solely by income tax, then on the margin, pulling back on the
redistribution accomplished by tax would be efficiency-enhancing,
while making up the lost redistribution by adjusting tort rules away
from efficient standards would incur no efficiency loss. This argument
does not rely on the character of the relationship between legal heterogeneity and income heterogeneity. In particular, this argument is
not defeated if the two perfectly coincide.9 5
The technical misconception that the existence of an equity role
for legal rules hinges on the existence of within-income-group differences points to a broader error of perspective. Despite the implicit
approach of the within-income-group differences qualification, there
is no sense in which the legal system plays a secondary clean-up role
for the income tax. It is wrong to view the legal system as the type of
redistributive tool that one resorts to only after the income tax has

done what it can, and only for purposes of reaching those differences
which the income tax cannot.
The second problem with the attempt to downplay the redistributive role of legal rules by relegating them to within-income-group heterogeneity is that this is, in fact, no real relegation. The implicit
statement that there are no significant within-income-group differences is logically equivalent to saying that income is a "sufficient statis94

The Technical Appendix § B.2 proves this assertion formally.

95

This proposition is proved formally in the Technical Appendix § B.2.
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tic" for the differences between individuals. In other words, that
other differences are essentially superfluous information. 96
Yet, in reality, income (or any other tax attribute) is but one part
of the full economic identity of an individual. Two individuals with
the same income may be quite different. One may derive the income
from trust or dissavings and spend her day in leisure. The other may
receive the same income from working frequent sixteen-hour shifts as
a medical intern. There is no reason to suppose that the one imperfect statistic of labor income (or statutory income, or consumption, or
wealth, for that matter) can adequately capture individual
97
differences.
E. The Importance of Importance9 8
Some might argue for tax-only redistribution on the basis of the
impression that income is the major source of inequality and so, by
virtue of its prominence, is rightly the sole instrument for redistributive effort. There are several problems with this assertion.
First, to the extent that this argument applies specifically to income, its premise is debatable. The data suggest that income per se is
of ambiguous importance in inequality. Using historical data, Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence Summers found in 1975 that sixty to
eighty percent of existing private wealth in the United States was inherited rather than earned by current holders.9 To be sure, this resilt concerns the source of the total amount of wealth, and so is only
indirectly related to the source of the dispersion in overall well-being.
Nevertheless, to the extent that we believe that wealth is more indicative of weli-being than income, this result suggests that income is not a
reliable indication of total well-being. And since a variable is only an
important factor in variance if it is also an important contributor to
the total, this result further suggests that income is not in fact as cen96 To see this equivalence, suppose that a group of individuals differ along the two
dimensions of height and age. Assuming that there are no "within-height.group differences" means that everyone who is 5' 10" tall, for example, is the same age. Age would be a

superfluous signal of individual identity in this strange population.

The preceding three sections have addressed arguments made in Kaplow &
Shavell, supranote 8. That article also contains a serious and fair assessment of tie practi97

cal and empirical difliculties of informing legal rules ith redistributional goals. Part IV
takes up these issues in detail.
98 See Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 807.
99 See Laurence J. Kolikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of Intergeneralional
Transfers in Aggregate CapitalAccumulation,89J. PoL. EcoN. 706 (1981); see also Franco Modigliani, The Role of IntergenerationalTransfers and Life Cyde Saving in the Accumulation of
WealthJ. ECON. PERsp., Spring 1988, at 15 (critiquing Kotlikoff and Summers); LaurenceJ.
Kotlikoff, IntergenerationalTransfers and Saving, J. Ecoq. PERsr., Spring 1988, at 41 (responding to Modigliani); cf. William G. Gale &John Karl Scholz, IntegenerationalTransfers
and the Accumulation of Wealth, J. ECON. P.Rsp., Fall 1994, at 145 (replicating Kotlikoff and
Summers's original results).
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tral a component of inequality as casual observation might suggest.
An earlier paper by the author of this Article corroborates this interpretation. 0 0 Pointing out that wealth is much more unequally distributed than income, that paper seeks the source of this difference in the
data on savings rates, concluding by process of elimination that the
difference can be explained only by inheritance.' 0 '
These data cast doubt on the widely accepted view that income
differences are the major source of economic inequality. But perhaps
one could identify a particular attribute other than income, or a set of
attributes which might include income, that could rightly be labeled
as "the main source of inequality in well-being." And perhaps this list
would exclude some or all aspects of the "private law," however defined. The question remains: does it follow that these aspects of the
private law should also be excluded from redistributive policy?
The sort of marginal analysis conducted in Part II.B suggests not.
As that analysis makes clear, the problem of choosing how to redistribute is not of the "desert island" variety. The problem is not: if we can
only take two or three redistributional instruments with us, which
should we take? Nothing insists that we so limit ourselves; in particular, there is no reason to believe that the tools we have are somehow
indivisible and that we are externally constrained in the number we
can employ.
The proper analysis is conducted unit by unit across all redistributive tools. Thus, imagine that we are redistributing solely by means of
the instruments on our hypothetical list of major sources of inequality.
The issue is not whether we should entirely replace one of these
sources with some part of the private law not included on the list. The
issue is whether, if we let up slightly on our redistributional use of one
of these instruments and instead substitute use of an area of the private law, we would improve social welfare.
The logic of marginal analysis suggests that the answer will be
"yes." Since we start with optimal use of the policy instruments on the
hypothetical list of important sources of inequality, the redistributional benefit of each listed tool will be precisely balanced by its redistributional cost. This is what it means to redistribute optimally. In
contrast, for the heretofore unused (and so perfectly efficient) legal
rule, there will be only redistributional benefit and no efficiency cost
at the margin. Thus, we will always gain by shaving off a little redistri-

100 See Chris Sanchirico, Why Is the Distribution of Wealth More Unequal than the
Distribution of Income? (Jan. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
101

See id.

2001]

THE NEW EFFICIENCY RATIONALE

1043

bution via the "important" factor and replacing it with some amount
02
of redistribution via the "unimportant" legal rule.
This is not to say that the important factors in inequality will not
be important determinants of redistributive policy, just that their importance does not implicate their exclusive use. It uill still be the case
that the most important components of inequality will dictate the direction of positive redistributional change in other, less important policy tools. If, for instance, wealth stock is the major component of
inequality of well-being, then helping those who are less well-off
means helping those with less wealth. In this case, the proper adjustment to any given legal rule would, in large part, be determined by
the correlation between wealth and the incidence of the rule change.
03
F. The Importance of Importance with "Fixed Costs"'

The analysis in Part ll.B becomes more complex if there are
"fixed costs" that must be paid before a given legal rule may be employed for redistributional purpose. Perhaps, for example, using a
given policy instrument to redistribute requires setting up an administrative apparatus, cultivating expertise, and forming a knowledge base
of relevant statistical information. All of these activities use resources
and their necessity raises the possibility that the benefit of using a
given tool to redistribute may notjustify incurring such start-up costs.
From this premise, one might conclude that only policy tools that
have a sufficiently large impact on inequality should be employed for
redistributional purposes. Perhaps one could further conclude that
the income tax is one of these policy tools, but that the private law is
not.
Assuming that such fixed costs are significant, 1 4 their presence
would indeed change the analysis. Without fixed costs, the argument
made in Part II.B suggests allocating the task of redistribution broadly
across all policy tools that have heterogeneous impact on the population. With fixed costs, however, the net positive impact on social welfare may not justify the initial payment. 0 5
102
The argument in this paragraph is made in Sanchirico, supra note 8. The Technical Appendix § B.2 makes this argument formally.
103
I thank Paul Mahoney for suggesting that I explicitly address this issue.
104
It is possible to overstate these costs as they apply to private-law redistribution if we
take the court system as it currently exists. Many of the fixed costs of private-law redistribution have already been paid. There is already a system of laws, case reporting, courts, and
lawyering in place. Insurance companies already possess much of the expertise needed to
establish the relevant correlations. Indeed, in many states it is already common practice to
gather information on defendants' wealth for purposes of calibrating punitive damages.
See supranote 59; see also infra Part IV (discussing these issues).
105 See, eg., Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Optimal and Administratihe Costs. 69 A. EcoN.
REv. 475 (1979) (positing a model in which, but for "administrative costs," it would be
optimal to tax all commodities, and finding that this does not continue to hold where
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It is quite another thing, however, to say that the presence of
fixed costs would favor certain policy tools over others. In particular,
there is no basis for the assertion that policy tools with relatively large
impact on inequality should be employed redistributionally, while
those with relatively small impact should not. There are, in fact, two
reasons why this assertion falters.
In examining the first reason, let us imagine that all policy instruments are currently set at their perfectly efficient levels and that we
are considering whether redistributional adjustments away from perfect efficiency are worthwhile. To test whether using a given policy
tool for redistribution is worth incurring the fixed costs of doing so,
we must compare the size of those fixed costs with the size of the
greatest possible net benefit of redistributing via the rule, not the
greatest possible gross benefit. In calculating the net benefit of redistributing by the rule, we subtract out the efficiency costs of effecting
the redistribution. The distinction between net and gross benefits is
an important one because policy tools that are important for equity
are likely also important for efficiency. While altering such rules may
have a large positive impact on equity, such alteration may also have a
large negative impact on efficiency. In addition, the fixed costs themselves are likely to be larger for tools with broader impact. Together,

larger fixed costs and larger efficiency losses defeat the intuition that
only those instruments with a large redistributional impact will be optimally employed for redistributional purpose.
Suppose, for example, that the best use of income taxes for redistributional purpose incurs a positive redistributional impact of 100
"social welfare units," but a detrimental efficiency impact of -90. Imagine that tort rules are much less important overall, offering at most
30 units of positive redistributional impact in return for 10 units of
efficiency loss. If redistribution by income tax and tort rule both have
the same fixed costs of 15, then only tort rules will be used to redistribute. Likewise, if the numbers for tort were 30 and -20, respectively,
but the fixed costs of redistributing via tort law were only 9 for tort
rules (and still 15 for taxes), then again only tort rules would be used
for redistributive purpose.
The second reason why the presence of fixed costs does not point
toward limiting redistribution to important policy tools rests on the
following facts: (1) there may well be similar fixed costs to adjusting

administrative costs increase at an increasing rate in the number of commodities taxed);
Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1990, at
157, 169-71 (discussing Yitzhaki's model and suggesting that administrative costs may depend on the number of different tax rates rather than on the number of commodities
taxed).
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policy instruments for efficiency, and (2) policy instruments may differ
as to the optimality of their status quo position.
Suppose that our economy comes to us in a particular status quo
position that may not correspond to perfect efficiency (in contrast to
what was assumed above) and that any adjustment away from the status quo (not just those for redistributional purpose) will incur fixed
costs. The proper way to analyze such a problem is to calculate the
socially optimal point irrespective of fixed costs and then compare social welfare at the status quo to social welfare at this "ex-fixed-costs
optimum." If the welfare difference between these two points exceeds
the fixed costs, then the social optimum is the ex-fixed-costs optimum.
Otherwise the social optimum is the status quo.' 06
For our purposes, the important implication is this: whether a
policy tool is adjusted at all depends not only on its contribution to
social welfare at its ex-fixed-costs optimal placement, but also on its
contribution to social welfare at the status quo. This makes it very
difficult to make general predictions about which policy instruments
to adjust and which to leave at status quo levels. Certainly, it defeats
any statement linking redistributional use and redistributional
importance.
For example, the status quo income tax might be no tax whatsoever, or a head tax just sufficient to raise revenue for the minimal
state. Similarly, the status quo tort system might be a "no liability" rule
under which victims always bear all the costs of accidents. From an
efficiency standpoint, the status quo tax is as good as it gets: there is
no distortion to labor-leisure choice because such choice does not affect an individual's tax liability. Perhaps this means that, even though
the tax is not helping out on the equity front, its status quo level is not
so detrimental that it would be worth incurring the fixed costs to
change it. The status quo tort system, on the other hand, is likely a
disaster on all fronts: it is probably grossly inefficient and it may well
make no contribution toward equity goals. Even if the tort system is a
less important component of inequality, and even if its fixed costs are
the same as for tax, its status quo state may be so unacceptable as to
make the fixed costs of changing it worthwhile. Of course, once the
fixed costs for tort are paid, the best choice is the ex-fixed costs optimum for the system. As in Part I.B, this choice will be informed by
both equity and efficiency goals. The result: because of differences in
the acceptability of their respective status quo states, the relatively important tax system is optimally purely efficient, while the relatively un106

The analysis is actually more complicated than this because the several policy in-

struments considered here interact with one another. The correct algorithm is to compare
social-welfare differences to fixed costs across all possible combinations of policy tool
employments.
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important tort system is optimally adjusted to account for equity
concerns.'

07

G. Bargaining Around Redistributive Rule Changes
Another objection to redistributing by legal rule is the fear that
whatever we try to accomplish by adjusting a rule will be undone by
the parties themselves in a private bargain. Thus, if we adjust landlord-tenant law to give the tenants additional rights, the parties may
write these entitlements out of the lease, or adjust the rent

accordingly.' 08
It is best to understand these problems as another form of the
behavioral response limiting all redistributional policy. When we tax
income, individuals may choose to earn less. When we raise damages,
individuals take more care. Similarly, when we set rules of contract,
parties may bargain around them. The behavioral response to contract rules is somewhat different in one sense: it concerns the behavioral response of a group of agents rather than of a single agent. The
literature on optimal taxes and rules has not adequately addressed
"coalition" incentives. Yet, in principle, scholars could and should account for the rule-mitigating responses of coalitions of individuals just
as much as for individuals acting alone.
107 The reader will notice that the various status quo states posited in the foregoing
discussion were fictitious. I have consciously not considered the following argument for
tax-only redistribution: (1) the actual status quo is such that we only redistribute by tax,
and (2) changing that fact would require significant adjustment costs (fixed costs, in a
sense). Such an argument can of course be leveled against any policy change, including
efficiency-enhancing changes.
108 This point is made clearly in POUNSKY, supra note 2, at 122-23 (citing Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distributionand the Ownership of Rights, 1J. LEGAL STuo. 223 (1972), and Koichi
Hamada, Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability, 66 At. EcoN. Rxv. 228
(1976)).
Other scholars have cast doubt on similar arguments in the context of competitive
markets (as opposed to duopolistic bargaining). Arguing that the distributional efficacy of
housing-code enforcement depends in part on whether its costs are passed on to tenants,
Bruce Ackerman demonstrates that this cost will not in fact be passed on when the supply
of housing is fixed (as it will tend to be when enforcement is citywide) and marginal tenants are indifferent to housing improvements. SeeAckerman, supra note 1. Richard Craswell refocuses the issue, arguing generally against the intuition that consumers or tenants
will be better-off in situations where sellers or landlords cannot pass on their costs (such as
those imposed by warranty, product liability, or housing-code enforcement). See Richard
Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Effidency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relalion-

ships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 381-83 (1991). He notes that the crucial demand-side condition for consumer benefit is, quite apart from the degree to which costs are passed on, that
"consumers who are willing to pay the least for the product itself are also willing to pay the
least for the warranty [or housing improvement]." Id. at 383. Craswell points out that the
tenants in the Ackerman model would benefit from housing-code enforcement as long as
the marginal tenant cares relatively less about the housing improvement, even though a
significant portion of the cost might be passed on to tenants. See id.
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That said, one should not overstate the impact of coalitional incentives on the taxes-versus-legal-rules question. In the first place, the
scope of the objection is limited. It does not apply to situations in
which bargaining is impractical, such as that between potential injurers and potential victims in accident law, or polluters and local residents in nuisance law. 109 It also does not apply to bilateral
contracting of any complexity in which default rules have real effects.
In these situations the scope of explicit agreement is not, and perhaps
could not be, complete with respect to all relevant contingencies.' 0
Secondly, and most importantly, the objection applies only to
changes in the law that attempt to directly address the outcome of the
bargain. The objection does not apply to changes that adjust either
the bargaining positions or the bargaining capabilities of the parties.
In general, rules that affect either how well a party might fare if it left
the table, or how effectively it could bargain if it remained, will have a
real effect on how the surplus of the bargain is distributed. Thus, various provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including
the right of a majority-approved union to bargain as a monopsony on
behalf of the entire work force, and management's duty to bargain
with this union in good faith, adjust the determinants of bargaining
outcomes."1
Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has a real effect on the distribution of surplus beaeen the
2
firm and its employees."
Lastly, it must be remembered that coalitional incentives are also
a limiting factor in tax policy. When an income tax is progressive, for
example, high-bracket individuals will try to attribute their income to
their lower-bracket family members and associates. Such issues have
13
been enormously important in the development of the tax law.'
109

See POUNSKv, supra note 2, at 122-24.

110

For a review of the literature on incomplete contracting, see Krmps, supranote 4, at

743-70.

I
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994) (dictating unions' exclusivity of representation); id.
§§ 157, 158(a) (regarding the duty to bargain in good faith). Once a union forms and is
recognized, the NLRA allows it to act on behalf of employees--even those employees that
did not vote for the union or participate in the petition process. Sre id. § 159.
112
Of course, the NLRB may also affect the size of this surplus.
113 See, eg., BrrrKER & McAnoN, supra note 62, 1 34.1 (1988). According to the
authors:
Assignments of income and similar transactions shifting... deductions or
other tax allowances from one person to another wvithin a family or economic unit usually exude an aura of tax avoidance.... The resulting legislative and judicial countermeasures, though responding to taxpayerinitiated plans to reduce the aggregate tax liability of a closely knit family or
other economic collectivity, have come to permeate the tax law so completely that they sometimes determine which of several parties to an ordinary business transaction must report a particular receipt or can deduct an
expense.
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IV
DATA, ERROR, AND APPROXIMATION

The new efficiency rationale purports to ground itself in the bare

logic of individual choice and social welfare. This Article argues that
this logic, as far as it goes, actually points in a very different direction.
Nonetheless, the analysis thus far does not rule out the possibility
that there may be other reasons, external to the logic of choice and
welfare, for favoring taxes over legal rules in any redistributive program. It is therefore worth considering a series of alternative arguments for eschewing private-law redistribution.
A.

Determining the Proper Redistributional Adjustment

14

One might argue that the task of redistribution should be assigned to policy instruments on the basis of how difficult it would be
to determine the proper redistributional adjustment in each case. In
the taxes-versus-legal-rules debate, one might be tempted to argue
against using the legal system because the proper adjustment is not
clear from the theory, and obtaining the data necessary to determine
the proper adjustment would be relatively difficult. While the analysis
provided in Part II.B points out the optimality of some adjustment to
legal rules, it does not say precisely what that adjustment should look
like-for example, it does not indicate whether damages should be
raised or lowered. And obtaining the data necessary to determine the
direction of the adjustment may seem like a daunting task.',
While the informational issue is an important one, it is easy to
overestimate its impact on the taxes-versus-legal-rules debate. The
same information problems plague the income tax. Progressive inI thank Alan Schwartz for suggesting that I address this issue. Some of the points in
this subpart are made in Sanchirico, supra note 8.
115 It is useful to distinguish the state's statistical knowledge from its particular knowl114

edge. One can know the statistical distribution of height for a population, but not know
the height of any particular individual. The optimal tax program assumes that the government does not know each particular individual's underlying situation. However, it grants
to the state the statistical knowledge necessary for proper allocation of various redistributional tools. This is partly justified by the fact that gathering and using statistical knowledge is not subject to the same incentive problems as gathering and using partictlar
knowledge. An individual may be more likely to reveal her relevant characteristics when
they will simply be tallied up with similar measurements for a large group of individuals.
This is because her report, as only one of many that ultimately shapes policy, will have a
negligible effect on her personal well-being. But once we treat this particular individual
according to what she tells us about herself, we invite her to color her report in a way that
makes our treatment more favorable.
Nevertheless, even statistical knowledge is costly to obtain. Accordingly, this subpart
considers the problems that stem from the need for and lack of statistical knowledge, while
continuing to assume that particular knowledge is never available.
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come taxes may be the redistributional hero of income-tax folklore.
But careful thinking about the income tax is far less sanguine.' 1
The formal theory of the redistributional income tax does not
provide definitive answers any more than the theory of redistributional legal rules. Indeed, some would argue that the absence of concrete theoretical results, such as the absence of a theoretical
justification for redistribution via progressive rate structures, is itself
one of the most interesting lessons of the optimal-tax literature. No
matter how much weight we place on equity in our social objective,
the equations we obtain as "solutions" tell us only that tax rates should
lie between 0% and 100% and that the top and bottom marginal rates
should be zero.1 1 7 The theory of the redistributive income tax, like
the theory of redistributive legal rules, is just a processor for data that

must be separately supplied.
Moreover, the type of data required for determining the right
way to redistribute via the income tax-indeed, via any policy instrument-is the same as for the legal system. The proper redistributional adjustment to any policy instrument depends generally on the
trade-off between (1) the extent to which the adjustment distorts behavior and (2) the extent to which the adjustment favorably redistributes. The first factor depends on the intensity of agents' behavior in
response to the rule change, that is, the "elasticity" of their decisions
with respect to the rule. The more elastic, the greater the distortion.
The second factor depends on the correlation between well-being and
the impact of the adjustment. The tighter the statistical association
between those who most benefit from the change and those who are
least weU-off, the more positive the distributional impact of the rule
change." 8 How these two variables balance depends on the relative
weights we accord to distribution and efficiency.
The argument in Part II.B for always adjusting damages away
from their efficient level conducts this same kind of balancing.' 9 In
that analysis, the distortion was to care-taking behavior (and was zero
116

See, ag., Graetz, supra note 20, at 18-19 ("The current practice of fashioning tax

legislation to achieve a particular result in a distribution table creates the illusion of precision when such precision is impossible.").
117
These formal results derive in large part from J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the
Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rv,. EcoN. STUD. 175 (1971). Nicholas Stem provides a lucid discussion of these results and others. See Stern, supra note 15, at 38. For a
less technical account, see Joel Slemrod, Do We Know How Progremsive the Income Tax System
Should BeF.,36 NAT'L TAxJ. 361 (1983). Uncertainty about whether rates should be progressive also appears earlier in the legal literature. Sr, e.g., NVALTER J. BLumi & FL{wn
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TA
xA.ON (1953). Despite its title, Blum
and Kalven's text raises arguments both for and against progressihity and concludes that
"[the case for progression [is] stubborn but uneasy." Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
118 This point is made precise by Peter Diamond's well-known "co-ariance formula."
See PA. Diamond, A Afany-Person Ramsy Tax Rule, 4J. PuB. Eco,. 335, 338 (1975).
119 There, however, the analysis was explicitly marginal and concerned te question of
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on the margin whether the adjustment was to increase or decrease
damages). The redistribution depended on the correlation between
well-being and the impact of increasing damages. Roughly, if the less
well-off tended to pay damages more often than they received them,
then decreasing damages was equity enhancing, the extent of the positive effect depending on the tightness of the association.
The same trade-off informs the analysis of how optimally to set
tax rates. If we raise or lower the tax rate at a particular level of in-

come, this will distort the choice of work effort. The redistributional
impact will depend on whether the set of individuals whose tax bill
increases as a result of the rate change tend to be more or less well-off
in the economy, taking account of not only income, but also leisure
and inherited wealth and advantage. The optimal degree of progressivity or regressivity is difficult to determine in this framework. It
turns on how this trade-off varies across different levels of income. In
particular, progressivity is not obviously optimal, because there is no
reason to think that higher levels of income are necessarily associated
with a trade-off more favorable toward redistribution. While the positive redistributional impact of increasing the tax on the very highest
incomes may be greater than that of increasing the tax on the lowest
income levels, the distortion of the behavioral response may also be
larger if the elasticity of labor supply increases with income.
One might respond that while income taxes and the private law
may be equal in terms of the types of data that would theoretically be
necessary, practical policy choices must be made on the basis of the
data that is actually available. Because we have more information pertinent to the income tax, the argument would continue, the income
tax should be the focus of our redistributional efforts.
But, arguments based on the current availability of information,
as opposed to the potential availability of information, inject a status
quo bias into policy analysis that is unwarranted, especially at the level
of academic discourse. If we know more about the income tax, it is
primarily because it plays such a prominent role in current policy. A
similar sort of bootstrapping would justify any policy currently in
place. Indeed, such a bootstrapping argument could have been used
against the income tax itself: when the income tax was adopted, we
knew quite a bit more about the consequences of tariffs than income
120
taxes.
whether to make any adjustment at all, rather than how to properly determine the
adjustment.
120
See, e.g., Roy G. BEAKmr & GLADvs C. BLAKE, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 75 n.l l

(1940) (stating that, at the time, a "federal revenue bill practically always meant a tariff
bill" and that "the federal government depended almost entirely on revenues from customs duties"); SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITs HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN D&
MOCRACY 308 (1942) ("'In 1913... taxes on commodities in the country or at its ports
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In any event, the belief that we have more information about the
income tax than about the private law is open to question. Insurance
companies stake their existence on understanding, in a dollars-andcents way, how different cohort groups interact differently ith the
tort system, and how individuals in general respond to changes in legal rules. These are precisely the two types of information necessary
for employing tort rules as redistributive tools.
Nonetheless, the fact that the informational problems of redistributing via legal rules is no greater than via taxes does not change
the fact that these problems are large in an absolute sense. The question is: then what? A familiar and puzzling response is to conclude
that it is best to refrain from even attempting redistribution via the
private law. But this response fails to recognize that to do nothing is
to make a choice. If our best guess involves doing something, then
there seems no reason to favor a worse choice over a better one simply
2because the worse choice happens to correspond to the status quo.1
Moreover, such debilitating caution with respect to equity-enhancing adjustments seems inconsistent. When it comes to efficiencyenhancing reforms, law and economics has always been willing to ad-

vocate taking positive policy steps with only a vague perception of the
empirical landscape. Determining the efficient rule is prone to informational problems of the same magnitude as is determining the redistributionally optimal rule. It is clear that neither "due care" nor even
"harm caused" could ever be precisely defined. 2 2- Yet no one seriously suggests that this uncertainty warrants the elimination of the tort
system. Instead, the tort system rests on the tacit agreement that it is
better to attempt to do something based on what we know, than to do
nothing because we can never be sure.
B. The Two "Haphazardness" Objections
1. Random Redistribution and HorizontalEquity
Another potential objection to redistribution by privrate-law rules
begins with the assertion that the redistributive event in the private
law is random rather than periodic, and narrowly focused rather than
broad-based. 123 Redistributing via the tort system means redistribyielded 94.6 per cent of all federal tax revenues. In 1930, taxes on personal and corporation incomes yielded 66.5 per cent of all federal revenues. Taxes on commodities provided
only 29.5 per cent.'" (quoting M. SLADE KrNDRICK, Tvxxrio-N Issus 25 (1933)).
121
See supra Part II.F for an analysis of adjustment costs.
122 Shapiro and McClennen make a similar point. See Shapiro & McClennen, supra
note 7, at 463 (dtingJ.D. Hanson & M.RL Hart, Law and Econonis, in A Co.s uioo TO TE
PILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (D. Patterson ed., 1996)).
123 See, eg., PouNsmy, supranote 2, at 126 ("[R]edistribution through the legal system
only may occur when a dispute arises, and not all members of a given income class ill be
involved in [the] dispute.").
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uting only when accidents happen to occur, and only among those
who happen to be involved. 124 Tax-based redistribution, on the other
hand, inherits the supposed regularity and comprehensiveness of the
underlying tax system. Two separate conclusions might be drawn
based on this potential distinction: (1) that tax-based redistribution is
more effective and/or (2) that it is more fair.
Let us begin by noting that this first "haphazardness" objection is
not an argument against redistributing via the private law per se, but is
rather an argument against redistributing via the rules governing
those components of the private law in which the redistribution would
be keyed to haphazard events. Of course, the private law goes well
beyond unintentional torts. Private law also governs property relations and contracts. It would be difficult to argue that these areas of
private law are any less comprehensive than taxation. After all, property, in one form or another, forms the tax base, and income often
flows from contractual arrangement. Thus there is the risk, in interpreting the haphazardness argument, that we will confuse the literature's proxy for the private law with the private law itself.
Yet even with respect to the system governing unintentional torts,
the haphazardness argument neglects the existence of accident insurance. Insurance transmutes the haphazard into the definite. The
prospective, probabilistic cost becomes the current, definitive
premium.
Consider, for example, the sort of income-independent changes
in the level of tort damages studied in Part II.B. Suppose that the welloff tend to be injurers more often than victims, so that the proper
redistributional adjustment would be to increase the level of damages.
But then imagine that individuals are fully insured against both the
harm that they experience as victims and the liability they face as injurers. Thus, when an accident occurs, the injurer herself pays nothing, the injurer's insurance company pays (legal) damages to the
victim's insurance company, and the victim's insurance company pays
actual harm to the victim. Each individual will pay a premium that
reflects the following: (1) the chance that she is an injurer; (2) the
level of damages that the insurance would have to pay; (3) the chance
that she is a victim; and (4) the difference between the damages that
the insurance company receives from the injurer's insurer and the
actual harm that the victim experiences.
In this setting, an increase in legal damages above actual harm is,
in the first instance, paid by the injurer's insurance company and
pocketed by the victim's. This will tend to reduce an individual's pre124
The next section considers the separate objection that not all those who benefit are
less well-off and not all those who lose are more well-off.
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miums to the extent that she is likely to be a victim, and increase her
premiums to the extent that she is likely to be an injurer. On average,
those more likely to be victims than injurers will see their premiums
fall, while premiums will increase for those more likely to be injurers.
In our example, then, the less well-off will tend to benefit from lower
premiums, while the more well-off will tend to face higher premiums.
This differential impact will not depend on the random occurrence of
accidents, but will apply to all individuals.
This is, to be sure, a highly stylized description of how insurance
brings the expected application of tort rules into the definitive present. In reality, no given individual is ever fully insured. And premiums only imperfectly reflect the true relevant probabilities and
outcomes. Consequently, there will always be residual uncertainty in
the effect of any rule for unintentional torts.
Yet to focus on this residual uncertainty as a reason to favor taxbased redistribution over redistribution by private law is once again to
implicitly ascribe to the tax system powers and properties that it simply does not possess. The same problem plagues all potential tax

attributes.
Income, for instance, can be as random as tort damages. Some
individuals, such as unhedged investors, entrepreneurs, commissioned salespeople, those with performance-based salaries, and temporary workers, face income risk directly. Almost all individuals face
uncertainties related to promotion or layoff. Indeed, to the extent
that one's income is not uncertain, this is probably due to partial insurance, just as in tort. With income, however, the insurance is implicit, and we tend mistakenly to believe that the resulting certainty is
structural. Holmstr6m and Shaveli suggest that not all employment
contracts are fully contingent on employee performance (as incentivesetting might seem to dictate) because the relatively risk-neutral firm
is well suited to implicitly insure its worker against the vagaries of the
economy and/or the random component in productive output. 12
Engineers and academics, for example, sign away their patent rights
in return for a fixed salary, thus insuring themselves against the risk of
not inventing or discovering. More generally, wages and salaries are
fixed on an annual basis, not because there is certainty about the employee's future productivity, but because the worker is implicitly insured. The difference between the worker's salary and the expected
value of her product reflects the implicit premium charged by the
firm for providing the insurance.
125

See Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Obseabilit), 10 B.tJ. Eco.v. 74 (1979);

Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in te Principaland Agzl RalionSldp 10 BEJ.
EcoN. 55 (1979).
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Thus, it appears as though taxes and legal rules are equally haphazard in this sense. But even if this were not so, this first form of the
haphazardness objection is conceptually problematic on its own
terms.
Suppose that the world consists of equal numbers of two types of
individuals, those who are well-off and those who are not. Imagine
that the state has the opportunity to redistribute resources between a
12
randomly chosen pair of individuals, one from each group. , Suppose, further, that the state can do nothing more. Assuming the state
values equity, should it effect the redistribution between the two individuals even though it cannot do the same for all pairs?
The redistribution would reduce almost every measure of incquality even if only slightly. Arguably, if the state cares about reducing
inequality and this single transfer is the best that it can do in that
regard, then it ought to make the transfer. To refuse to institute a
beneficial policy in a specific instance because that policy would not
have the same effect in all similar instances, with "similar" suitably defined, would be to eliminate almost all state action, including the
prosecution of criminals and the compensation of victims.
One might nonetheless argue against the isolated transfer on the
basis of some notion of "horizontal equity": that is, that "like" ought to
be treated "alike." Why should this one well-off individual be punished while all other well-off individuals remain immune? Similarly,
why should this one less well-off individual receive a benefit while all
12 7
others who are less well-off receive nothing?
This notion of "horizontal equity" is plagued by two debilitating
ambiguities. First, the operational effect of the concept depends on
an arbitrary determination of who is considered on the same "horizontal" level with whom. This problem is particularly acute in the argument against haphazard redistribution. Consider again our
hypothetical. If there is a horizontal-equity argument against making
the random transfer between the pair, it must somehow be that all
those who are less well-off should be treated as one similarly situated

group and all those who are more well-off should be treated as another, such that the random transfer increases "vertical equity" between the two groups at the expense of horizontal equity within each
cohort.

But what justifies drawing a horizontal line between the two
groups? All that separates the more well-off from the less well-off is
126 1 assume throughout my analysis that the amount redistributed is not so great that
it simply reverses the ordering of the two individuals and results in the same or greater
distance between them.
127 I thank Eugene Vokolh for bringing this very valid issue to my attention at a workshop at the UCLA School of Law.
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their relative well-being. Arguably, all members of this hypothetical

population should be placed on the same horizontal plane. But then
redistribution within the single pair would have very different consequences for horizontal equity. The transfer would actually increase
horizontal equity as redefined, since it works toward treating like alike.

The other debilitating ambiguity in the concept of horizontal equity concerns the issue of when to measure well-being. Even if one
draws the line between the two cohorts in the example, there is the
issue of whether we should measure well-being before or after the random choice of the transfer pair. A horizontal-equity problem crops
up only if we measure after the pair is selected. If we instead measure
ex ante, all individuals within each group will be on the same footing
because all face the same likelihood of being chosen for the transfer.
2.

Error in the Perfect Policy

One may also object to redistributing via private law because it is
haphazard in another sense. Given that redistributional adjustments
to the private law will be based on population-wide correlations and
not individual-by-individual calculations, there will be cases when our
adjustment inadvertently redistributes in favor of the more wel-off,
and thus exacerbates inequality.1-8 The across-the-board adjustment
to the damages rule discussed in Part ll.B, for example, was to be chosen based on whether it affected the desired redistribution on average. It would not do so in every case unless correlations were perfect.
In the aggregate, raising the level of damages (if this were the proper

adjustment) might tend to help the less well-off at the expense of the
more well-off, but some of the more well-off would gain and some of
the less well-off would lose.
In terms of our thought experiment from Part IV.B.1, it would be
as though the state were faced with a decision as to whether to redistribute between these two individuals knowing only that it was likely
that the first was more well-off than the second. It would then face the
possibility that any attempt at redistribution would actually act against
its equity objective.
The response to this objection echoes responses made throughout the Article. In the first place, every redistributional policy, particularly the income tax, shares this attribute. When we impose higher
taxes on those with higher incomes, there is no guarantee that we are,
128
See, eg., PouNsicy, supra note 2, at 126 (stating that "[i]t may be that higher income
persons are more likely to be drivers than pedestrians, but certainly there are many lowincome drivers and high-income pedestrians" and that "[t]hus, liability rules regarding
driver-pedestrian accidents are not very precise instruments for accomplishing income redistribution," but that "in some kinds of disputes (wvith sharper correlations], the choice of
legal rule might contribute towards the implementation of distributional goals").
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in every case, creating the desired redistribution. One individual with
higher income may actually be worse off than another with lower income; perhaps the lower-income individual has more wealth, or has
worked much less for only somewhat less income.
In general, all feasible redistributional policies will involve error.
The inevitability of the error is a direct result of the fact that the variables upon which we can practically base redistribution are imperfect
signals of individuals' true underlying identity and well-being.
In any event, the possibility of error should not necessarily dictate
inaction. This Article drew a similar conclusion in Part IV.A with regard to errors in determining the optimal redistributional adjustment.
The errors at issue here are somewhat different because they concern
the fact that even the optimal redistributional adjustment, calculated
with perfect knowledge of all relevant correlations, can only be right
on average. But the argument for action is essentially the same. We
should resist ascribing special standing to the status quo, and understand that making no redistributional adjustment is just as much of a
policy choice as making an adjustment.
Thus, in the revised hypothetical considered above, we should
view a failure to effect the proposed redistribution between the two
individuals as involving the same degree of choice as redistributing.
As the hypothetical was originally cast in Part IV.B.1, the state could
determine with certainty which choice was equity-enhancing. In the
revised hypothetical in this Part, the state is forced to play the
probabilities: it knows only that the transfer is likely to be redistribufive. But uncertainty does not imply that inaction is the best choiceno matter how averse one is to risk. 129 In this case, it may well be best
to effect the proposed redistribution between these two individuals,
because doing so will decrease the expected value 30 of any viable
3
measure of inequality.' '
V
DECONSTRUCrING THE

PuRE

FoRMAL

"PROOFS" OF

EFFICIENCY

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell provide what is perhaps the
most complete statement of the new efficiency rationale in their influential paper, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
129

Consider, for example, the choice of whether to purchase insurance.
One would calculate the expected value of this equality measure by first multiplying the possible levels of the measure by their probabilities and then summing the results.
131 In particular, the state should choose the policy that maximizes the expected value
of social welfare (or some other statistic of the distribution of social welfare that expresses
social preference over uncertain social states).
130
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RedistributingIncome.13 2 While Kaplow and Shavell reference the informal double-distortion argument as laid out in Part I, they also go beyond this by providing a formal model in which they prove that "only
the income tax system should be employed to achieve distributional
goals," 3 3 and that "it is appropriate for economic analysis of legal
rules to focus on efficiency."3 m The purpose of Part VA is to show
that although these proofs are logically correct they rely on the assumption that all agents are identical with respect to the legal system.
The Technical Appendix expands upon some of the more technical
aspects of this discussion and contains formal proofs of the main
assertions.' 3 5
A portion of the optimal-tax literature which predates Kaplow
and Shavell's 1994 article considers conditions on individuals' preferences and endowments under which it would be optimal to tax only
income. Although these arguments were eventually discounted within
the optimal-tax literature, they have resurfaced in law and economics
in several areas, including the debate over whether legal rules should
take account of equity concerns. Part V.B offers a critical analysis of
this subliterature and connects it to Kaplow and Shavell's 1994 article.
A.

The Absence of Legal Heterogeneity in the Kaplow and
6
Shavell Model'

Despite the impression one might glean from the informal discussion in their article, Kaplow and Shavell's efficiency results do not
actually rely on double-distortion reasoning. Indeed, as we have seen
in Part I.B, their argument could not rely on double-distortion reasoning. What, then, makes their argument work? In particular, how does
their argument avoid the logic described in Part H.B, which seems to
point toward a pervasive role for legal rules in redistributive policy?
132
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6. Their paper expands on results that originally
appear in Steven Shavell, A Note on Effidenoy vs. DistributionalEquity in Legal Rulemaking:
ShouldDistributionalEquity MatterGiven OptimalIncome Taxation?,71 Ami. Ecov. RE%,.: P.wEs
& PROC. 414 (1981). Other papers have made similar arguments. S&eAanund Hylland &
Richard Zeckhauser, DistributionalObjectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Chaice orDesign, 81 Sc u~mxvLN J. Eco\,. 264 (1979); Kaplow, Optimal Supply, supra note 87; Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in RAUoDoo: FoR Pcauc Ecoou~tics
(Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., forthcoming 2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, PropertyRues Versus Liability Rules: An EconomicAnalysis, 109 RLu. L REv. 715, 744
n.99, 745 n.102 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, PropertyRules]. Polinsky also argues
against some forms of redistribution by legal rule. See Pou.sl, supra note 2, at 119-27.
This Article addresses these arguments in Part IV. See supranotes 10809, 128 and accom-

panying text.
Kaplow & Shavell, Propery Rules, supra note 132, at 745 n.102.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 677.
135 See Technical Appendix §§ A, B.1, B.3.
136 The assertions in this subpart are proven formally in te Technical Appendix § B.1.
These points are also made in abbreviated form in Sanchirico, supra note 8.
'33
134
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Kaplow and Shavell's efficiency result derives from the fact that
the legal sphere in their model lacks any independent redistributional
potency. As this subpart explains in detail, a series of implicit assumptions leads to the result that any income-independent change in legal
rules affects the utility of all agents in their model by precisely the
same amount. Either everyone's utility goes up by x, or everyone's
utility goes down by x. Thus, in the Kaplow and Shavell framework,
trying to redistribute via across-the-board adjustments to legal rules is
not so much suboptimal as impossible.
It is important not to fault Kaplow and Shavell for their model's
simplicity per se. The central issue here is whether to locate our redistributional efforts in the legal system, the income tax, or both. To the
extent that Kaplow and Shavell's simplifying assumptions eliminate effects extraneous to this central issue, all the better. The point of this
subpart is that several of Kaplow and Shavell's assumptions are not
merely simplifying, but result-driving.
In the Kaplow and Shavell framework, cleansing the model of legal heterogeneity is no mean feat. There are three separate avenues
by which a change in legal rules affects any given individual. Two of
these concern the individual's capacity as a potential victim, and the
other, her capacity as a potential injurer. The effect on individual
well-being at each of these points of impact may potentially differ in
both direction and magnitude among different individuals. All these
points of impact may, therefore, contribute toward the overall differential impact of the rule change. Yet four separate assumptions in the
Kaplow and Shavell model ensure that these effects are precisely the
same for each individual. First, we consider the three points of impact; next the four assumptions.
To fix ideas, we will consider increasing the level of damages
from the amount of harm caused to harm caused plus $1,000.13 7 Considering this sort of across-the-board adjustment will help to illuminate what really drives Kaplow and Shavell's results. In particular, we
know from Part I.B that double-distortion reasoning does not apply to
across-the-board adjustments. On the other hand, IKaplow and
Shavell's pure-efficiency result rules out across-the-board equity adjustments as much as it does specific income conditioning.
1.

The Three PotentiallyHeterogeneous Points of Impact

Kaplow and Shavell study a highly stylized legal system in which
the only private law is tort, the only legal rule is the level of damages
that defendants pay under a strict-liability standard, and the only form
137 Following the example of Kaplow and Shavell, let us ignore the possibility that defendants will be judgment proof. The analysis would be essentially the same if we were to
decrease the level of damages by a specific amount.
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of behavior regulated by the legal system is the precautionary effort of
injurers. Individuals, who are risk-neutral, choose how much to work,
how much to consume, and how much care to take. All injurers end
up in court, and the court, once the case is before it, can perfectly
discern causation and harm. How does increasing damages by $1,000
affect the well-being of a given individual in this framework?
a.

The Individual as Victim: Inpacts A and B

Let us begin compiling the list of effects on this individual by
imagining her as a potential victim. However cautious other people
are, they may end up injuring our individual. The $1,000 increase in
the level of damages means that she will receive more compensation
in this case; even though injury is still not beneficial, increased compensation makes it less detrimental on net, and the individual is therefore better-off in her capacity as a potential victim. This is the first
point of impact, hereinafter "Impact A."
Second, we must account for how the population's behavioral response to the change in the damages rule affects our individual. An
increase in the damages rule will likely cause other individuals to increase their level of precaution. This will mean that our individual
will be injured less often. If the tort system is currently undercompensating for injuries, this increase in general precaution will increase our
individual's well-being. If the system is overcompensating, however,
the increase in caution will decrease our individual's well-being.las
b.

The Individual as Injurer: Inpact C

We finish the list of three points of impact by now imagining our
individual as a potential injurer. However cautious, our individual
may end up causing an accident. The third and last impact of increased damages, then, is that the individual will have to pay more
when and if this happens. To the extent that she is a potential injurer,
139
this decreases her well-being.
138 Recall that in Kaplow and Shavell's framework the victim's behavior does not affect
the probability and severity of accidents.
139
What about the cost of the individual's heightened precaution? It is one of the

great conveniences of this sort of marginal analysis that in assessing the impact of a policy
on an individual, we need not account for the individual's own behavioral changes. Although the individual will certainly alter her behavior, this iill not affect her well.being on
the margin. Roughly, the reason is as follows: the fact that she has chosen her behavior
optimally before the change in the rule means that marginal changes in her choice of
precautionary effort can have no effect on her well-being. Therefore, marginal changes in
her well-being, due to changes in her choice of precaution, which in turn occur because of
changes in the legal rule, also have no effect on her well-being. This idea is formally entifled the "envelope theorem" and its application depends on the assumption that utility is
continuously differentiable. For a fuller explanation, see Ian Ayres, Pushing the Enrdope:
Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theoren, 17 Mtss. . L RE%,. 21 (1996).
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Thus, when we increase the level of damages, our individual experiences the following: (A) she receives more when she is a victim;
(B) she is injured less often (which could be good or bad depending
on whether damages are more or less than harm); and (C) she pays
140
more when she is an injurer.
2.

Four HomogenizingAssumptions

For any change in the level of damages, the effect on well-being
via all three of these avenues, A through C, is precisely the same for all
individuals in Kaplow and Shavell's model. Creating this homogeneity requires four interwoven assumptions. Instead of stepping through
each assumption in turn, this section organizes the analysis of these
assumptions according to their effect on the three points of impact.
a. The Individual as Victim: Homogenizing Impacts A and B
All individuals in the Kaplow and Shavell economy have precisely
the same preferences and precisely the same endowment with the one
exception that different individuals earn different amounts for each
hour of work. That is, individuals have different "productive abilities."
We will call this restricted form of heterogeneity "assumption 1."
One particular manifestation of assumption 1 is that all individuals in Kaplow and Shavell's world are equally harmed by every accident. One might imagine that there are different kinds of accidents
and that different individuals are prone to different types of mishaps.
Farmers are more likely to be injured in tractor accidents, urban
dwellers in taxi collisions; blue-collar workers are more likely to be
injured in the factory, white-collar workers on the elevator. One
might also imagine that correlations exist between the frequency of
victim status and other indications related to individuals' overall wellbeing. Certainly, insurance companies imagine such correlations.
But in Kaplow and Shavell's model only one generic accident takes
place, and it injures everyone to precisely the same degree every time
it occurs.
This significantly (but not completely) homogenizes the first two
impacts discussed above (A and B).141 Because all individuals face
precisely the same probability of suffering this generic injury, any increase in the damages rule will be paid equally in expected value to all
individuals. If damages are set to harm plus $1,000, then each individual receives this additional $1,000 with precisely the same probability.
This concerns impact A. Impact B is similarly affected: any reduction
140 Symmetrically, if
we were to decrease the level of damages, our individual would.
(A) receive less when a victim; (B) face the prospect of more frequent injury; and (G)pay
less when an injurer.

141

See supra Part V.A.1 (a).
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in the probability of accidents, as a result of the population's behavioral response to the rule change, affects each individual's probability
of injury by precisely the same amount. We can summarize this by
saying that in Kaplow and Shavell's model, any adjustment in the damages rule affects each individual's "victim lottery" by exactly the same
amount-where an individual's victim lottery is the list of potential
outcomes for an individual in his capacity as victim (including both
injury and compensation), along with the respective probabilities of
these outcomes.
Of course, that the rule change affects each individual by the
same amount in dollar terms does not mean that the rule change has
a uniform effect on all individuals in terms of well-being. A dollar of
additional compensation, for example, may mean different things to
different people. Eliminating this residual source of difference in impacts A and B is the job of assumption 2.
Assumption 2 is actually the conjunction of two subsidiary assumptions. First, for a given individual in Kaplow and Shavell's
model, the marginal utility of a dollar (in terms of compensation) is
the same no matter how many dollars the individual already possesses.
Second, this constant marginal utility of a dollar for each individual is
uniform across all individuals. Thus, an additional dollar of compensation increases everyone's utility by the same amount no matter who
they are or what their income level is.
In conjunction, assumptions 1 and 2 insure that any change in
the level of damages affects not just the balance sheet but also the
utility of each individual-in her capacity as a potential victim-by
precisely the same amount.
b.

The Individual as Injurer: Homogenizing Inpart C

The bulk of this subsection demonstrates that the combination of
assumption I and two new assumptions, assumptions 3 and 4, ensures
that all individuals in Kaplow and Shavell's world take the same
amount of care. 142 From this it follows easily that changes in tort law
have a homogenous effect on individuals in their capacity as potential
injurers. When all individuals take the same level of care, they are
equally likely to cause the one generic accident in Kaplow and
Shavell's model. This in turn will mean, apropos of impact C, that any
increase in the level of damages affects each individual's "injurer lottery" by precisely the same amount: all individuals pay the $1,000 increase in the level of damages with the same frequency. Given that
everyone's injurer lottery changes by the same amount, assumption 2
142
Recall that we are considering an across-the-board adjustment in the damages rule.
Individuals will take different levels of care if damages are keyed to their differing incomes.
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insures that this uniform change has a uniform effect on individual
utility.
The crux of the matter, then, is to explain why everyone takes the
same level of care in Kaplow and Shavell's model. We get part of the
way there by explaining how by virtue of assumption 1, the manner in
which precautionary choice enters both the utility function and
budget constraint is precisely the same for all individuals.
One might imagine that individuals who differ in their ability to
convert work effort into dollars would also differ in their ability to
convert precautionary effort into safety. What, after all, does the word
"ability" mean when it stands behind the word "productive"? If we
define ability to mean the motor skills necessary to operate intricate
machinery or the intelligence required to design bridges and circuits,
one would think that these same attributes also have an impact on the
individual's adeptness in exercising precaution. The same reasoning
applies if ability implies diligence and earnestness. Yet, in the Kaplow
and Shavell model, differences in the choice problem faced by each
individual are confined to the rate at which each individual can trade
hours of work for dollars in the labor market.
While this restriction is necessary for the result that all individuals
take the same level of care, it is not sufficient. The fact that individu-

als' choice problems within the legal system are the same does not
generally imply that their choices within the legal system will be the
same. This is because the heterogeneity that is introduced in labor
productivity is hard to confine. Parametric differences in one sphere
of choice typically infect other spheres through interdependencies in
individual decision making.
Thus, we might expect that additional labor productivity would
be reflected first in higher earnings, and then in more consumption
of certain goods and less of other goods. In this way, differences in
productive ability manifest themselves, inter alia, in terms of differences in consumption patterns. Similarly, individuals of differing productive ability (and thus of different incomes) might make different
choices about the manner and extent of precautionary effort. Likely,
they will participate in different activities requiring different methods
of precaution. These differences in precautionary activity would in
turn lead to differences in the probability that the individual causes an
accident, and thus to differences in the impact of our proposed
change in the damages rule on the individual in her capacity as
injurer.
In general terms, choice interdependencies operate through two
sources: individual budget constraints and individual preferences.
Kaplow and Shavell's third and fourth assumptions, respectively, act to
cut off each of these two avenues.
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The content of assumption 3 is that an individual's precautionary
effort does not affect the range of feasible choices available to her in
terms of leisure or consumption, and vice versa. In other words, precautionary effort is "off-budget." In Kaplow and Shavell's model, an
individual who wishes to consume more must sacrifice leisure time to
earn the necessary income, and conversely an individual who wants
more leisure time must resign herself to less consumption. In contrast, an individual may increase precautionary effort without limit,
irrespective of how much time she is spending at her job, and of how
much income she spends on pure consumption goods. Thus, although an individual would always prefer to engage in less rather than
more precautionary effort, the cost of precautionary effort is purely
preference-based and not incurred in terms of lost consumption or
leisure.
The fourth and last assumption-pertaining to preferences
rather than the budget constraint-is that precautionary effort does
not affect an individual's enjoyment of leisure or consumption, and
vice versa. In particular, the marginal utility of leisure and consumption is assumed to be independent of the amount of precaution an
individual has taken, and likewise, the marginal disutility from precautionary effort is assumed to be independent of the amount an individual works and consumes. It is, of course, easy to imagine that the
enjoyment of one's car, and the value of one's leisure time generally,
would be greatly curtailed if one decided to use tie car only to commute in order to avoid causing accidents. But this type of utility inter1 43
dependence is ruled out in the Kaplow and Shavell model.
In concert, then, the third and fourth assumptions guarantee that
an individual's choice of precautionary effort is independent of the
rest of her choices. While assumption 1 does allow for differences in
an individual's labor-leisure choice problem, assumptions 3 and 4
guarantee that this heterogeneity does not infect the legal system via
budget constraints or cross-effects on marginal utility. As a result, all
individuals in Kaplow and Shavell's world will choose precisely the
same level of precautionary effort both before and after the hypothesized redistributional adjustment.
3.

Summary

In the general case, tort law affects different individuals differently. Even in the simplest framework, the tort law has several points
of impact and the effect of each on well-being will vary across individuals. It is no doubt an indication of their modeling prowess that
143 Technically, utility in Kaplow and Shavell's model is additively separable in leisure,
consumption, and care choice.
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Kaplow and Shavell manage to present to us a model with ostensibly
heterogeneous agents in which every one of these impacts is precisely
the same for all individuals. But once we understand and appreciate
this feat, it is also no wonder that the tort law has no redistributive
role in optimal policy in their model. Kaplow and Shavell have effectively rendered the tort law incapable of effecting redistribution of any
kind, optimal or not. In the end, the real reason "Why the Income
Tax is More Efficient at Redistributing Income than the Legal System," to quote the title of their article, is that only the income tax can
"redistribute income" in their model. Importantly, the answer has
nothing to do with counting distortions and is certainly not an impli144
cation of optimal-tax logic.
14
5
B. Return of the "Income Tax Only"'14 Conditions 6

Notwithstanding the fundamental inclusivity of optimal-tax logic,
many scholars in that area at one point pursued the search for conditions under which it would be optimal to tax only labor income in
redistributive policy. Early papers were enthusiastic about the possibility that plausible conditions could be found. 147 But as this research

program progressed-and the underlying nature of the problem became clearer-the focus shifted away from advocating a single tax on
income, toward the more agnostic task of asking what it would require
for this to be optimal. In the end, given the theoretical restrictiveness
of the conditions identified, and the fact that none could be shown to
enjoy empirical support, the answer was "too much." 148
144 More precisely, the only means of redistributing via tort law in the Klaplow and
Shavell model is to condition damages on income-i.e., to tax the income of tortfeasors,
Kaplow and Shavell's formal proof of their pure-efficiency result entails showing that any
redistribution accomplished by legal rules can be replaced with a more efficient adjustment of the income tax. It is possible to demonstrate precisely how the logic of this proof
falters when there is legal heterogeneity. Because this is a more technical discussion, it Is
relegated to sections A and B.3 of the Technical Appendix.
145 This is also referred to as the conditions for "uniform commodity taxation." For an
explanation of why these two names mean essentially the same thing, see infra text
accompanying note 157.
146 The points in this subpart also appear in more technical fashion in Sanchlirico,
supra note 8.
147 See, e.g., A.B.Atkinson &J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versits Indirect
Taxation, 6J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976); Angus Deaton, Optimally Uniform Commodity Taxes, 2
ECON. LErraes 357 (1979); Deaton & Stem, supra note 47 (correcting an error in Deaton,
supra).
148 The literature culminates in Angus Deaton, Optimal Taxes and the Stncture of Preferences, 49 ECONOMErIUCA 1245 (1981). Deaton presents these "income tax only" conditions
to demonstrate that existing empirical studies seeking to calculate optimal taxes were effectively building results into their maintained hypotheses because these studies were forced
to adopt such conditions due to data limitations. See Stem, supra note 15, at 43-46, for a
critical appraisal of this literature.
In the years following the publication of Sanchirico, supra note 8, the field of public
economics has revisited the income-tax-only literature, confirming earlier findings that re-
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Nonetheless, the advocacy of "income tax only" conditions has of
late resurfaced within the law-and-economics literature.1' 19 In particular, such conditions have played some role in the taxes-versus-legalrules debate. 50 It is, therefore, worth explaining what these conditions are and how they work. In light of what this Article has already
explained about the nature of the optimal tax enterprise, an intuitive
explanation of how these conditions operate should suffice to re-establish that they are less relevant than has been recently proposed.
Once these conditions have been explained, it will be possible to relate them to the particular assumptions in the Kaplow and Shavell
model, as described in the previous section.
1.

An Intuitive Explanation of Incone-Tax-Only Results

An explanation of income-tax-only results begins with the fact

that in a world with only two goods-say, leisure and apples-there is
never any social-welfare reason to tax more than one. This is easiest to
see if we restrict attention to simple proportional taxes stated as a percentage of expenditures or receipts. Suppose, for example, that eliminating the income tax means that each individual keeps 10% more of
what she earns. 15 ' Each hour of work then buys 10% more apples.152
suilts therein rest on artificial assumptions. See, e.g., HELultrn-t CREtM'

ET t., DirCr VERsSUS INDIRECT TAxATIoN: THE DESIGN OF THE TAx Smc=,RE Rxvsrrm (UniversitE

Catholique de Louvain Ctr. for Operations Research and Econometrics, Discussion Paper
No. 9910, 1999) (finding that, contrary to Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 147, optimal tax
policy implicates more thanjust an income tax, even if preferences are separable between
labor and produced goods), available at http://ivacore.ucl.ac.be/senices/psfiles/
dp9910.pdf (last updated Mar. 9, 2000); EnA-NLEL S.2z, THE DEsimuu-n OF Cou'MionM
TAxATION UN-DER Nox-LINEAR INCOME TAxxnoN N D HrrsocENEOvs TAMrES I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8029, 2000) (finding that "a small tax on a
given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this
commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure"); Robin Boadiway
et al., Redistibutionwith UnobservableBequests: A CaseforTaxing CapitalIncome, 102 Sc,L i:\vLANJ. EcoN. 253 (2000) (finding a redistributional basis for capital-income taxation when
individuals differ notjust in labor productivity but also in the size of their inheritances).
149 Se, e-g., Louis Raplow, A FrameorkforAssessingEstateand Gift Taxation, in RErtuN.
ING ESrATE AND GIrr TAXAnON 164 (William G. Gale et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (applying income-tax-only conditions to the issue of whether estate and gift taxes should be
repealed); Kaplow, Optimal Supply, supranote 87 (applying income-tax-only conditions to
the finance of public goods); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6 (applying income-tax-only
conditions to the issue of whether legal rules should be informed by equity goals).
150
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 8, at 825-26 (referring to income-tax-only conditions, inter alia, as "standard"); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 676 n.15 (citing income-

tax-only results).
151

This would be the case if the income tax were initially about 9.0%.
This is true regardless of the price of apples. Suppose, for instance, that the price
of apples is $0.50 and initially income is $100 per hour. Then the individual can purchase
200 apples per hour of work. If the individual's income goes up by 10% to $110, then the
number of apples she can purchase also goes up by 10%, to 220. Similarly, if the price of
152

apples is $0.25, then the number of apples she can purchase goes from 400 to 440, also a
10% increase.
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If we then increase the tax on apples such that what used to cost a
dollar now costs $1.10,153 the individual is back to where she started in

terms of the real trade-off between apples and leisure. Instead of
earning, say, $100 per hour after tax, she now earns $110; but the
bundle of apples that she was able to buy with $100 now costs her
$110. One hour of leisure time foregone still trades for the same
number of apples.
Accordingly, we would expect the individual to work and eat apples in just the same amount as before the changes. Thus, from the
individual's point of view, and also from the point of view of any social-welfare function built from individual utilities, reducing the income tax to yield 10% more take-home pay while simultaneously
increasing the after-tax cost of the single good by 10% has no net
impact.
Moreover, there will be no change in the tax revenues that the

government collects. What the government collected at the point at
which the individual earned the money, it now collects at the point at
which she spends it. The government collected $10 in income tax per
hour of work; it now collects $10 in apple tax per hour of work.
Thus, eliminating the income tax while suitably increasing the apple tax has no real effect on the economy. Symmetrically, eliminating
the apple tax and suitably increasing the income tax would also have
no real effect. Consequently, whatever we can accomplish-in terms
of maximizing social welfare subject to a government budget constraint-by taxing both goods, we can also accomplish by taxing only
one. This is the sense in which, in our two-good world, it is always
54
optimal to tax only one of the goods.
But in a world having three or more goods, say leisure, apples,
and automobiles, the argument made for the sufficiency of taxing
only one of the goods no longer holds. Suppose, for example, that
initial commodity taxes are such that if we reduced the tax on automobiles to 0%, the individual could buy the same number'51 5 of automo153 This would be the result if, for example, the apple tax were initially 20% and we
raised it to 32%.
154 This is a general idea and applies to any tax structure, not just simple proportional
taxes. The more generally applicable statement of the idea is as follows: the budget line
(which will be nonlinear with nonlinear taxes, and should be stated in terms of net excess
demands for the purposes of this explanation) is the set of bundles that are just affordable.
Every point on each consumer's after-tax budget line is associated with the following: (1) a
unique amount of leisure; (2) a unique number of apples; and (3) a total tax bill. It
matters not for the shape of the budget line, and therefore not for individual choice (nor,
therefore, total tax revenue), whether we quote the total tax bill as a function of leisure or
of apples. Each bundle on the line will still be affordable, and each bundle above the line
will still be unaffordable (given positive producer prices).
155 Most automobiles are not divisible goods. More plausibly, we could thtink of this
good as "automotive services."
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biles with 15% less cash, whereas if we reduced the apple tax to 0%,
the individual could buy the same number of apples if 10% less

cash.' 5 6 Suppose we then eliminate both taxes and, as in our discussion of the two-goods case, attempt to adjust the income tax to keep
the individual's trade-off between leisure and each of automobiles and
apples the same as it was before the change. We will quickly find that
this is impossible. If we increase the income tax such that take-home
pay per hour decreases by 10%, then the apple-leisure trade-off returns to what it was, but the automobile-leisure trade-off ends up more
favorable to automobiles. Conversely, if we increase the income tax
such that take-home pay per hour decreases by 15%, then the automobile-leisure trade-off is restored, but the apple-leisure trade-off tilts in
favor of leisure.
Of course, we always can impose assumptions upon consumer
choice that make the three-good world act just like the two-good
world. The income-tax-only literature does precisely this. In terms of
the view of redistribution described in Part H.A, such assumptions boil
down to the requirement that, given leisure choice, apples and automobiles are not separate signals of individuals' underlying characteristics. Suppose, for example, that all agents in the economy consume
apples and automobiles in the same proportion-say, three hundred
apples for every automobile. As a result, there are really only two
goods: leisure and a composite good consisting of three hundred apples and an automobile. Once we know how many apples a given consumer has eaten, we automatically know how many automobiles she
has in her garage (one three-hundredth of the number of apples consumed). And since we learn nothing new about an individual's underlying characteristics by acquiring separate knowledge of her apple and

automobile consumption, there is no reason to treat the two commodities separately in our optimal tax program. Consequently, we find
ourselves back in the two-good world, where we know that it is never
necessary to tax more than one in the effective pairof goods (leisure
and the apple-automobiles composite). Thus, we lose nothing by taxing leisure alone.
In particular, when apples and automobiles form a composite
good in this sense, we will never have trouble using adjustments to the
income tax to neutralize the elimination of both apple and automobile taxes, as attempted in the paragraph before last. Given that consumers treat three hundred apples and one automobile as a single
commodity, it will always be optimal for the tax system to tax them as

156 This would be the case if the tax on automobiles
tax on apples was initially 11.11%.

s initially about 17.65% and the
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such.157 This implies that the optimal tax (stated as a percentage of
expenditure) will be the same for both commodities. This, in turn,
implies that reducing the optimal tax on automobiles and apples to
zero will mean the same percentage decrease in the amount of cash

necessary to purchase a given amount of either good.'-" It will then
be possible to restore the trade-off between leisure and both goods
1 59
simultaneously merely by adjusting the income tax.
Of course, the same logic implies that it is also optimal to tax only
the apples-automobiles composite good, and not income. Furthermore, nothing about the logic of this result requires that we group
commodities in a particular way. We can always reset our assumptions
so that, for instance, leisure and automobiles comprise the package
commodity: our result then would be that it is optimal to tax either
apples only or the leisure-automobiles composite only. It should be
emphasized that none of these assumptions has empirical support.
Thus, any privileging of one assumption over the others-for example, any assumption that singles out leisure-has no justification; that
is, none beyond the fact that it produces the result that the modeler
desires.
2.

Income-Tax-Only Results and the Kaplow and Shavell Model

How do the income-tax-only conditions just described relate to
Kaplow and Shavell's formal model and results? Kaplow and Shavell's
model satisfies the income-tax-only conditions a fortiori. In Kaplow
and Shavell's model there are three "goods": consumption, leisure
and precaution. As noted in the previous section, the individual's
choice of precaution is structurally independent of the individual's

choice of leisure and consumption, and differences among individuals
only arise in the labor market. Consequently, all individuals choose
the same level of precaution. 160 Thus, it is certainly true that once we
know an individual's consumption, learning about his level of precaution (via the event of his causing an accident) communicates no more
information about who he is. Indeed, even if we do not know his consumption level, his level of precaution transmits no new information
about his underlying characteristics.
157 In other words, the optimal tax solution will entail uniform commodity taxes. The
income-tax-only literature is actually more commonly thought of as the "uniform commodity tax" literature. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 14748.
158 For example, if the tax on both goods is 10%, then eliminating both taxes means,
for both goods, that what used to cost $1 now costs about $0.91.
159 Continuing the previous example, supra note 158, if the income tax rate were initially 10%, we would raise it to about 18.18%.
160
This assumes that damages are not a function of income. This assumption isjustifled by the fact that there are no general income-tax-only results allowing for cross-dependent policies. It is not at all clear that the conditions thus far identified in the literature
are sufficient for income-tax-only results when cross-dependencies are allowed.
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Thus the difference between Kaplow and Shavell's assumptions
and the income-tax-only conditions is the difference between incremental and absolute informational value. The income-tax-only conditions require only that precaution have no incremental informational
value regarding the individual's underlying characteristics given
knowledge of his level of consumption. This holds a fortiori in the
Kaplow and Shavell model, in which precaution has no informational
value whether or not we know how much the individual consumes.
CONCLUSION

An impressively large portion of modem legal scholarship rests
on the precepts of law and economics. And much of law and economics-as currently practiced-rests on its ability to justify its exclusive
focus on efficiency. With so much at stake, one might imagine that
arguments for efficiency would be subject to continuous challenge
and scrutiny. But, at least in recent years, this has hardly been the
case.
Perhaps it is the rhetorical effectiveness of the verbal arguments
now being put forward for efficiency. Perhaps it is the fact that such
arguments appear to be fortified with impregnable mathematical
modeling. Perhaps it is a simple collective reluctance to go back and
adjust results that have already been settled on the basis of efficiency

alone. Whatever the reason, it has of late become acceptable in law
and economics to dispose of equity with a quick citation to the newrationale literature and a nonchalant gesture toward the income tax.
Upon close inspection, it becomes clear that new-rationale arguments provide a less-than-stable foundation for the field's exclusive
focus on efficiency. Both the verbal and the formal versions of newrationale reasoning fall far short of a coherent argument for efficiency. The verbal presentation-the double distortion argument-is
flawed in two ways. On its face, it simply has no bearing on redistributional adjustments to legal rules that are not specifically structured to
depend on the income of the parties to the action. Further, given its
implicit reliance on "distortion counting"-rightly disfavored in public economics for more than four decades-it fails as an argument
against the form of income-conditioned adjustments that it does
address.
The flaw in the technical manifestation of the new rationale pertains not to its logic, but to the premises to which that logic is applied.
The formal argument for efficient legal rules turns out to depend on
untenable result-driving assumptions. Such assumptions, which severely limit how individuals differ from one another in the model,
create an artificial world in which income-independent adjustments to
legal rules are redistributionally impotent-
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Perhaps there is an argument waiting to be found that will enable
law and economics to continue in its established routine. It is never
possible to say with certainty that no viable argument exists, only that
those that have been put forward are insufficient. Nonetheless, the
refutation of yet another rationale for efficiency must indicate something. Perhaps it suggests that seeking a reason to ignore equity is no
longer the best use of the field's collective intellectual resources. Perhaps "efficiency" now dictates that we turn our attention to making
equity an operational criterion for evaluating legal rules.
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TEcHNIcAL APPENDIX

A. Where Kaplow and Shavell's Tax Substitution Argument
Falters with Legal Heterogeneity16 1
Kaplow and Shavell employ a "tax substitution" argument in their
formal proof of pure efficiency 62 and it may be helpful to show where
that argument would go awry were legal homogeneity not imposed
upon the model.
The gist of the tax substitution argument is this: For every redistributional legal rule (including those conditioned on parties' incomes) we can find an alternative tax surcharge that accomplishes
precisely the same redistribution but also raises tax revenue-tax revenue that can then be distributed to the population or used for public
goods. The conclusion is that any redistribution accomplished by adjusting legal rules away from efficient standards can be better accomplished with taxes.
In the presence of legal heterogeneity, this argument fails on two
scores. First, the substitute tax surcharge that Kaplow and Shavell propose only exists in an artificial world in which all individuals with the
same income are affected in the same way by changes in the tort system. Second, even when legal heterogeneity exists only across and
not within income groups, so long as that heterogeneity is in part due
to the direct impact of underlying differences,163 Kaplow and Shavell's
argument will not fully account for individuals' behavioral responses
164
to the substitution of the tax.
In order to explain these two points in more detail, it will be necessary to delve more deeply into Kaplow and Shavell's tax substitution
argument. Though this argument is quite technical, it is possible to
explain its general features without resorting to the mathematical apparatus in the Kaplow and Shavell proof.
Starting from an efficient-damages rule (in the Kaplow and
Shavell framework, this means setting damages equal to harm' 6 5), imagine some proposed adjustment to the damages rule that would
make the damages paid by each liable defendant turn on her income, 166 all for some (here unspecified) redistributional purpose.
161 The assertions in this section are proven formally in section B.3 of this Technical
Appendix.
162 See Kaplow & Shavell, supranote 6, at 669.
163 See supranote 83 and accompanying text (discussing te distinction beteen direct
and indirect sources of legal heterogeneity).
164 The assumption that there are no within-income-group differences in individuals'
interaction with the legal system was discussed in Part III.D. See infra note 175 for an
explanation of how the analysis in the present section relates to the anal)sis in Part 11.D.
165 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 678.
166 We could likewise consider a more complicated rule in wvhich the level of damages

depends on the income of both parties. Nothing in the following anal)sis would change.
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We can represent the new damages rule by making a "damages
table" (Table 1) that, like a tax table, lists income in the first column
and the damages that must be paid in the second. (In the Iaplow and
Shavell framework, damages need not also be stated as a function of
harm, because there is only one possible level of harm. 16 7) The damages table might look like this:
TABLE 1

NEW DAMAGES RuLE
Income ($)

Damages (Rebate) ($)

less than 10,000
10,000-50,000
50,000-150,000
greater than 150,000

(2,000)
2,000
7,000
10,000

Adopting this damages table, from an initial position of efficient
damages, will benefit some members of the population and hurt
others. To keep track of incidence, we can imagine a hypothetical
"impact list" (Table 2), that shows precisely how the adjustment affects
each individual in the population. The impact list might look like
this:
TABLE

2

IMPAcT LIST

Name

Loss (Gain) ($)

Mary
Bob
Bill
Jane
Manny

4,000
(5,000)
4,000
(1,000)
4,000
>0

The first column of the impact list contains the name of the individual' 68 and the second column lists the monetary equivalent of the
loss suffered (or, if negative, the gain enjoyed) by this individual as a
167
In a model with many levels of harm, we would have one damages table for each
level of harm, or alternatively, one multidimensional damages table with a level of damages
corresponding to each combination of harm level and income.
168 In reality the government will have only a statistical knowledge of incidence and
will not know how each particular individual is affected by adoption of the damages table.
See supra Part II.A. This hypothetical impact list is presented for expositional purposes
only. Both Kaplow and Shavell's proof and the treatment of it here assume that the government cannot actually construct this list. If it could, perfectly corrective transfers would
be feasible. See id.; discussion supra note 2.
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result of society's adoption of the damages table, starting from a regime of efficient damages.' 69
As is appropriate, in calculating these "before-versus-after" gains
and losses, after means not only after the rule change but also after
individuals' consequent behavioral adjustments. Thus, we change the
damages rule, allow individuals to alter both their precautionary effort
and their work effort, and only after they are done adjusting do we
calculate how much better or worse off each of them is relative to
their position before the policy change.
The impact list describes the redistribution accomplished by the
change in the legal rule. We can think of the government's adoption
of the damages rule as a transfer of well-being from those on the list
who lose (those with positive numbers) to those on the list who gain
(those with negative numbers). Of course, the transfer is made with
the proverbial leaky bucket. Since we adjust damages aw-ay from the
efficient rule, and the efficient rule maximizes total well-being, losses
will outweigh gains in the second column of the impact list, and sumring this column over the entire population will produce a positive
total (as shown), signifying aggregate net loss.
In lieu of this redistributional adjustment to the damages rule,
Kaplow and Shavell propose an alternative adjustment to the income
tax.' 70 It is important to understand the precise nature of this adjustment. To this end, imagine inserting a third column between the two
now comprising the impact list. This new second column, in Table 3,
would contain the income of the individual listed in the first column.
TABLE

3

IMPACr LIST PLUS INCOME

Name
Mary
Bob
Bill
Jane
Manny

Post-Damages Adjustment Income (S)
80,000
5,000
70,000
14,000
80,000

Loss (Gain) ($)
4,000
(5,000)
4,000
(1,000)
4,000
>0

If we look at the second and third columns of Table 3, and ignore
for a moment the names of the individuals, we see a list matching
each level of income with an individual's net loss, positive or nega169
Because this is an explanation of Kaplow and Shavell's construction, it emplo)s
their assumption that utility is linear in money with the same coefficient for all agents.
This justifies use of monetary equivalents of utility gain and loss.
170
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 671.
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tive, from the proposed adjustment to damages. Shifting perspective,
we can view these columns as a regular tax table-an association of
income levels with dollar amounts. This is illustrated in Table 4.
(The dollar amounts may be positive or negative, so, more descriptively, the table is a tax-subsidy table.) To construct Kaplow and
Shavell's mimicking income tax adjustment, we treat this constructed
tax table as a surcharge on top of the pre-existing income tax:
TABLE

4

INCOME TAX SURCHARGE

Name
Mary
Bob
Bill
Jane
Manny

Income ($)
80,000
5,000
70,000
14,000
80,000

Surcharge (Credit) ($)
4,000
(5,000)
4,000
(1,000)
4,000
>0

An individual first calculates her income tax using the pre-existing income tax table and then adds on the surcharge (or subtracts the
credit, if the number is negative) given by Table 4.
Kaplow and Shavell make two claims about this alternative supplemental tax. First, its redistributional impact will mimic precisely
that of the proposed damages adjustment. 171 Second, the supplemental tax will raise revenue-revenue that can be used for government
172
spending, increased transfers, or reduced taxes.
As noted, two problems defeat the construction and operation of
this mimicking tax adjustment in settings other than the special
framework that Kaplow and Shavell employ. First, the adjustment will
not in general be well defined. Consider again the manner in which
we constructed the supplemental tax from the impact list for the damages rule. The supplemental tax charged at a particular income level
was defined as the impact of the damages rule on an individual having
that level of income. But what if there are several individuals with that
level of income, 173 each of whom experiences a different impact from
the damages adjustment? Which individual's gain or loss becomes the
supplemental tax for that level of income?
171
172

See id. at 673.
See id.

Given that there are approximately 273 million people in the United States, almost
all of whom earn less than $50,000 per year, a crude calculation suggests that there will be
over five thousand individuals at each dollar amount of income-and many times that in
each tax bracket .U.S. CE sttS BUREAUT, SrA'rxnsrcAL AInstACI OF THilE UNrTEll) SIArmm 7 tbl.2,467
tbl.738 (2000).
173
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In the tables listed above, Mary and Manny suffer the same loss$4,000-from the damages adjustment. Coincidentally, they also have
the same income-$80,000. Thus there appears to be no ambiguity
here in the construction of the supplemental tax: those earning
$80,000 pay a surcharge of $4,000. But what if Mary and Manny, still
having the same income, were affected differently by the damages adjustment? Suppose, for example, that Manny's loss was $2,000 and
not $4,000. What would be the proper tax surcharge at the $80,000
income level? Would it be Manny's loss of $2,000 or Mary's loss of
$4,000?
Construction of the supplemental-tax table presupposes that with
each level of income there is associated one and only one level of gain
or loss as a result of adopting the damages table. Yet, as already
noted, taxable income is only a rough approximation of a person's
economic identity (does the income come from a trust fund or an
hourly wage?). In particular, that two individuals have the same income may say very little about how they would fare as a result of adopting the damages table. True, their identical income level will mean
that they will pay the same in damages (according to the damages
table above). But the fact that their damages levels are the same does
not say that they are affected the same by the damages rule. Consider
that the three points of impact of a change in the damages rule, as
identified above in Part V.A.1, were calculated in a world in which all
individuals, notjust all individuals of the same income, faced the same
damages level. Yet these three points of impact were still three separate avenues by which different individuals would be affected differently by changes in the damages rule. The same three points of impact
provide potential differences among a smaller group of individuals
having the same income.
Kaplow and Shavell avoid this fundamental ambiguity in the construction of their tax supplement with a set of assumptions, highlighted in Part V.A.2, that eliminate differences in these points of
impact. In their economy, all individuals who earn a given level of
income will be identical in all other respects as well, including their
interaction with the tort system and, specifically, their gain or loss
upon adoption of the damages table. 17 4
We have already seen that, starting from an income-independent
damages rule, the impact of an income-independent shift in the damages rule in the Kaplow and Shavell model is precisely the same for all
individuals, at any income level. All individuals take the same amount
of care, and so they face the same change in their "injurer lottery."

174

See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 672-73.
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Moreover, all individuals are affected identically by all accidents, and
so they face the same change in their "victim lottery."
When damages are conditioned on income, individuals in the
Kaplow and Shavell model will, in fact, face different injurer and victim lotteries. As potential injurers, individuals will differ most obviously in the level of damages that they must pay if they cause a given
injury. This will, in turn, cause them to adopt different levels of care.
As potential victims, individuals may also face different amounts of
damages depending on their income level.
The important point, however, is that all of these differences will
be driven entirely by differences in damage levels, which in turn derive
solely from differences in income, via the damages table. Thus, conditioning damages on income in the Kaplow and Shavell model will produce differences in damages paid, damages received, and care taken,
but all individuals at a given level of income will still be identical with
respect to their interaction with the tort system.
Even if we were to assume that the impact of the damages adjustment is fully determined by income level, the mimicking tax adjustment that Kaplow and Shavell propose would still only work under the
very specific structure of their model. Thus, we turn to the second
reason that the Kaplow and Shavell proof does not generalize to the
natural case of legal heterogeneity.
The structural assumption now at issue is the fact that Kaplow
and Shavell do not allow for parametricheterogeneity in individuals'
interaction with the tort system.' 75 In other words, in the Kaplow and
Shavell model, underlying differences do not go directly to individu76
als' interaction with the legal system.

Kaplow and Shavell assume that individuals differ parametrically
with respect to the labor market,' 77 productive ability is a parameter.
Analogous differences in the sphere of tort, which do not appear in
the Kaplow and Shavell model, might include differences in "care abil175 There is nothing inconsistent in admitting parametric differences in tort while retaining the hypothesis (however ungrounded) that there are no within-income-group differences. Whatever parametric differences are assumed in tort need only be made a
deterministic function of whatever parametric differences are assumed for labor markets.
Differences in care ability, for instance, can be assumed perfectly to track differences in
productive ability, as if the ability to produce goods and services efficiently were of the
same source as the ability to produce care efficiently. That parametric differences need
not produce within-income-group differences implies that assuming away within-incomegroup differences is not enough to make Kaplow and Shavell's tax substitution argument
viable. This corroborates the point made in Part III.D, that, contrary to Kaplow and
Shavell's assertion, the argument for equity-informed legal rules survives the removal of
within-income-group differences.
176 See discussion supra Part III.C.
177 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 677.
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ity." Alternatively, different individuals might have proclivities to be
injured in different sorts of accidents with differing frequencies.
When such parametric differences are allowed, Kaplow and
Shavell's mimicking tax adjustment stumbles on a complication that
we have thus far glossed over. Substituting the tax supplement that
Kaplow and Shavell propose for the proposed damages rule in Table 1
will generally induce agents to change the amount that they work. As
we shall see, this will, in turn, imply that the tax supplement will Vot in
fact mimic the damages table.
To show that this is an independent problem let us assume that
there are no within-group differences. Given adoption of the new
damages rule, Mary is $4,000 worse off than she would be if the tort
system were efficient. (See Table 2.) With the new damages rule in
place, Mary chooses to earn $80,000. (See Table 3.) Kaplow and
Shavell's mimicking tax supplement would then, inter alia, charge all
individuals earning $80,000 (who are identical to Mary by hypothesis)
$4,000 in additional tax. (See Table 4.)
Now if it were true that Mary would also choose to earn the same
amount, $80,000, under the mimicking tax supplement, the impact
on Mary of the tax supplement would indeed mimic the impact on
Mary of the new damages rule. Instead of paying $4,000 more in expectation through the tort system, as shown in Table 2, she would be
paying $4,000 more in supplemental taxes under Table 4. Kaplow

and Shavell count on this invariance in work effort when structuring
their mimicking tax supplement.
With parametric legal heterogeneity, however, there is no reason
to believe that Mary will choose to earn precisely the same amount
under both regimes. Before explaining why this is so, let us first examine in detail why this would be a problem. Suppose Mary, who
would choose to earn $80,000 under the new damages rule, would
decide to earn only $49,000 under the mimicking tax surcharge. Suppose, also, that under the new damages rule, $49,000 is associated with
only $2,000 of loss in tort. 17s The mimicking tax supplement would
then charge Mary $2,000, which is less than the $4,000 that she would
actually lose if we adopted the new damages rule. For similar reasons,
the tax supplement may charge others with less income than Mary too
much relative to the impact on them of the new damages rule. The
result would be that the tax supplement would not, in the end, have
the same redistributional impact as the damages table. Moreover,
given the possibility that significant numbers of individuals respond by

178
Recall that we have assumed for purposes of argument that there are no uithin'ncome-group differences.
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working less, there is no longer any guarantee that the tax supplement
would raise revenue.
This explains why Kaplow and Shavell's construction falters if individuals react to the substitution of a supplemental tax for the new
damages rule by changing how much they work. To see why parametric differences in tort would cause them to react in this way, consider
the following simple example based on the tables above.
First, imagine that there are no parametric differences in tort.
This implies that individual differences in tort are entirely driven by
differences in the damages they face, which in turn are determined
according to differences in their incomes. We will examine the very
simplest illustration of the fact that work incentives will then be the
same under the new damages rule and the tax supplement.
Notice in Table 1 that the new damages rule happens to be such
that individuals earning $70,000 must pay the same amount of damages-$7,000-as individuals earning $80,000. Thus, in the absence
of parametric differences in tort, $70,000 earners are impacted the
same by adoption of the damages table as $80,000 earners. Consistent
with this, Table 3 shows that Mary and Bill, $80,000 and $70,000 earners, respectively, both suffer by $4,000 from adoption of the damages
table. Further, Table 4 shows no difference in the tax surcharge
across the $70,000 and $80,000 income levels.
Thus Mary faces the same incentive to lower her earnings to
$70,000 under the new damages rule as she does under the alternative
tax supplement. Neither her (expected) damages nor her tax
surcharge change if she chooses to earn $10,000 less.
Now let us introduce a simple form of parametric difference in
tort by assuming that $70,000 earners differ from $80,000 earners in
their capacity as victims. Let us suppose that as a result of this difference, $70,000 earners would lose $1,000 less than $80,000 earners as a
result of adoption of the new damages rule. Thus, the impact suffered
by Bill would be $3,000 rather than $4,000. And more generally, in
Tables 3 and 4, we would see $4,000 next to the $80,000 income level
and $3,000 next to the $70,000 income level.
Notice that this $1,000 difference in impact from the new damages rule operates across, and not within, income groups.' 79 We are
179 Three technical notes: First, although we focus on parametric differences on the
victim side, one could easily imagine parametric differences on the injurer side, such as
differences in the ability to effect precautionary measures, that would have the same effect
as the example we are about to describe. Second, nothing in this example, except Its
simplicity, turns on the fact that Mary and Bill are in the same damages bracket in the
damages table. Third, differences in choice variables across income levels, such as differences in care choice caused by differences in damages levels across income levels, will
generally exist in Kaplow and Shavell's framework and are actually not subject to the problem that we are discussing here. This is not at all obvious, but follows from the so-called
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supposing a difference between the $70,000 and $80,000 earner groups.
Notice, correspondingly, that there is no difficulty here, as there was
above, in defining Kaplow and Shavell's tax supplement; the supplement is simply $1,000 less at the $70,000 level than at the $80,000
level.
However, with the introduction of this across-income-group difference, Mary's work incentives under the tax supplement will differ
from her work incentives under the new damages rule. Let us continue to focus on Mary's incentive to earn $10,000 less, and so enter
the $70,000 income bracket. First, consider Mary's incentive to earn
$10,000 less under the new damages rule. Earning $10,000 less means
more leisure (in an amount depending on the productivity of $80,000
earners) and $10,000 less consumption. But earning $10,000 less has
no impact on how well Mary does in her capacity as injurer, because,
by the simplifying design of our damages rule, Mary's damages do not

change if Mary earns $70,000 rather than $80,000. Moreover, Mary's
interaction with the tort system as victim also remains fixed: Mary is
still the same person facing the same underlying parameters. Thus,
under the proposed adjustment to damages, Mary's incentive to work
less and earn $70,000 rather than $80,000 is confined to the leisureconsumption trade-off.
Compare Mary's incentive to earn $10,000 less under the tax supplement. Here, Mary will face an additional incentive to reduce earnings. Certainly, Mary would have more leisure and less consumption,
just as under the new damages rule. But on top of this, Mary's supplemental tax is reduced when she earns $10,000 less. The supplemental
tax at the $80,000 income level is $4,000, while at the $70,000 level it is
$3,000. Since the tax supplement is keyed to the cost that would be
imposed on individuals as a result of the new damages rule, and this
cost is less for $70,000 earners than for $80,000 earners, Mary can reduce her supplemental tax bill by reducing the amount that she earns.
What is happening in this example? Individuals at the lower income level ($70,000) are hurt less in their capacity as victims by the
change in the damages rule. Because this turns on who they are
within the tort system per se, and not what their income is, higher
earners cannot, under the new damages rule, enjoy this reduction in
loss simply by lowering their income. In the tax supplement world, how-

envelope theorem. See supra note 139. The envelope theorem states that in calculating
how well an individual would fare as a result of a change in an exogenous ,-ariable,we necd
not, on the margin (and under certain differentiability conditions), consider die effect of
induced changes in her choice variables. Here, this means that in calculating differences
in how individuals at different levels of productive ability (the exogenous variable) fare as a

result of the damages rule, we need not consider their differences in care choice.
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ever, higher earners do enjoy this benefit when they lower their
income.
Could another kind of tax supplement solve these problems and
extend Kaplow and Shavell's tax substitution argument to account for
parametric differences in tort? We already know that the answer is no.
There can be no tax substitution proof of the optimality of purely
efficient legal rules when individuals differ with respect to the legal
system. Indeed, there can be no proof by any means, because, as
shown informally in Part II.B and formally in this Technical Appendix, section B.2, a proof does exist for the opposite proposition.
B.

Mathematical Analysis
1.

The Absence of Legal Heterogeneity in the Kaplow and Shavell
Model: MathematicalReprise

This section of the Appendix consists of three subsections. This
subsection complements the discussion in Part V.A, which explains
how the Kaplow and Shavell model avoids the general argument for
equity-informed legal rules as described in Part II.B of this Article and
in section B.2 of the Appendix. In particular, this subsection shows
that across-the-board deviations from efficient damages have no distributional impact in the Kaplow and Shavell model.'1 0 This assertion is
established after describing the Kaplow and Shavell model in mathematical terms.
Kaplow and Shavell posit a population of individuals who interact
in the labor market and in the tort system.' 8 Each individual chooses
how much labor H > £ > 0 to supply, and how much care x > 0 to take.
(Consumption from labor income is implicitly determined by labor
choice.) If an individual chooses to work £ hours, she earnsy = atVin
pre tax income, where (X> 0. Individuals differ according to their (productive) ability a. (The distribution of a is discussed below.) The individual keeps y - t(y) of her pre tax income, where the function t, the
tax schedule, is a policy variable. If an individual takes care level x, then
the probability that she causes an accident is p(x), where p' < 0, p">
0. Whenever an accident occurs, it causes harm h. This harm is borne
equally by all agents. The individual causing the harm pays damages
of d,18 2 and all agents share the proceeds equally. Therefore, in the

Kaplow and Shavell model, an individual with ability cf chooses labor e
and care x to maximize expected utility.
This argument was originally made in Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 814.
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 677.
In the Kaplow and Shavell model damages may be a function of parties' incomes,
Since the object here is to show that the legal system has no independent redistributional
potency, such rules are not considered in this section.
180
181
182
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wherep is the average accidentprobabilityacross the population andy (h
- d) is the expected amount of unrecovered harm (possibly negative)
befalling this individual. The efficient level of damages in the Kaplow
and Shavell model, the level that maximizes total individual utility, is d
= h. The efficient income tax is a "head tax" (t(y) is constant in y), whose
size depends upon how much revenue the government must raise.
Let us now show that changing the damages rule affects all individuals' utility by precisely the same amount in the Kaplow and Shavell
model. Write v(td a) - EU(e*(ta),x*(d);td oX) for individuals' indirect
utility. This is the maximum level of utility attainable for an individual
of ability a when taxes are t and damages are d By the envelope theorem, vd= -p+ p- pd(h- d), where Vd represents tie derivative of
indirect utility with respect to the damages rule. All individuals face
the same care choice problem (essentially, that of choosing x to minimize x + p(x)d). Therefore, p is the same for all agents. We conclude
that Vd is also the same for all individuals.
2.

A Generalization of Sanchirico'sEquity-RegardingResult to Any
Kind of Legal Heterogeneity

In this subsection, the Kaplow and Shavell model is altered by
adding the realism-enhancing feature that individuals differ
parametrically with respect to their interaction with the tort system. It
is then shown that this implies that the damages rule in the Kaplow
and Shavell model should be adjusted away from perfect efficiency so
long as there is any social concern for equity. Thus, this formal analysis constitutes a proof of the assertion made in Part ll.B. Reference is
also made to several of the arguments in Part HI.183
Recall that in the Kaplow and Shavell model individuals differ
parametrically according to a and that this enters the model only
through labor-leisure choice. Let us now introduce an additional parameter y that is directly relevant to choice and welfare within the tort
system and that varies across the population (the distribution of 7 is
discussed below). Perhaps'y measures productivity of care-effort in
the same manner that a measures productivity of labor-effort.184 The
183 This subsection is a generalization ofa technical argument that appears in Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 813-20. The generalization is to an arbitrary form of legal heterogene-

ity, rather than heterogeneity that enters through differences in "care effectiveness."
184 Productivity in the labor context means units of output per units of work. Productivity in the care context might mean percentage points of accident probability reduced
per hour of precautionary effort.
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parameter 'y could also reflect the varying tendencies of individuals to
be victims.
Importantly, -ycan be related to x in any way with no effect on the
overall result that legal rules should be equity-informed. Indeed, 'Y
and a can be deterministically related. In this case, all individuals with
the same ax and so the same income will have the same y and so the
same tort-based welfare. This is the case of no within-income-group
differences discussed in Part III.D, and the fact that this case is subsumed within the general result to follow constitutes a formal proof
that within-income-group differences are not a precondition for the
optimality of equity adjustments to legal rules.
Relevant to PartIU.C regarding cross-effects, the argument in this
subsection retains Kaplow and Shavell's assumption that labor choice
and care choice are perfectly separable. That is, in this variant of the
Kaplow and Shavell model it will still be the case that there are no crosseffects between the tort system and labor-leisure choice. Thus, the
argumentinthis subsection also constitutes a formalproof of the assertion
in Part III.C that cross-effects are not a precondition for the result that
legal rules should be equity-informed in the presence of any social concern for equity.
Let *(t,A and x*(d,y) be the utility-maximizing choice of leisure
and care by individual (cxy), when faced with tax system t and damages rule d. (Such notation reflects the fact that, as noted, this argument maintains Kaplow and Shavell's assumption that the choice of
labor and care are separable under this utility function.) Let

v(t,d,a,7) E EU(*V (ta),x*
(d,y);td,a,y) be the individual's indirect utilit
function. We can divide indirect utility into the utility derived from

(tc),and

optimal labor choice,

the utility derived from the tort system vT(d,y). (In the special case

that y represents only productivity in care effort, we would have vr(d,
y) = -x*(d,y) - p(yx*(d,y))-

(h-d).)

Represent the population

distribution of a and y with the joint-density functionf(,y).

In what

follows, all expectations "E[.. .]" are taken with respect to this density,
and a "-" indicates which variables are random.
We wish to determine what the optimal tax system and damages
rule would be, if we were concerned not just with total well-being in
our economy, but also with how that total is distributed. In order to
treat these issues with precision and consistency, we imagine the problem faced by a fictional social planner who chooses the tax system I
and the damages rule d to maximize a well-defined social-welfare function. This social-welfare function (along with the choice of individual
utilities) will express the planner's preferences over policy choices,
and will incorporate in a coherent manner the planner's attitude toward what is casually thought of as the equity-efficiency trade-off. The
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planner solves the problem: choose t(y) and d to maximize

subject

to:

E[&

)]>_
S,

where the social planner is constrained by the necessity of raising S in
tax revenue. Social welfare SWFis a "weighted sum" of individual utilities, where Wis the weightingfunction. Several things are worth noting
about SWF First, it will be assumed that the weighting function III
increases in v. This means that the planner's preferences over policy
variables respect Pareto superiority. Second, the extent to which the
planner is concerned about equity is reflected in the extent to which
W's slope, W'(v), decreases in v-i.e., the extent to which III is concave. To the extent that Wflattens as it increases, the increase in social welfare from transferring "utils" to the less well-off will exceed the
decrease in social welfare from transferring the same number of
"utils" from the more well-off.
In order to show that the optimal level of damages will not be the
efficient level, we will examine the derivative of social welfare with respect to d and evaluate that derivative at efficient damages.Y If this
derivative is not zero, then we know that efficient damages are not

optimal. We can then examine the sign of this derivative to establish
that social welfare can be improved by adjusting damages aw-ay from
efficiency in a manner that helps those who are less well-off overall.
Differentiating SWFwith respect to d gives

SVF, = E[1W'(D)%)I=
=

Pd'i~-'i
+ TV%

E[1V'+E[(w' )-

J.

which may be further simplified and stated as a first-order condition:
SWEd=

WV'Vd
effldencyeffect

+cov

'(V).iJ=o.

(3)

equltyfect

In this model, the efficient level of damages is the level of damages that maximizes the simple sum of individual utilities. 180 Maximizing the simple sum of individual utilities is the same as solving the
social-welfare problem with a linear weighting function, for which
W'(v) is constant over v. The first-order condition for efficient damages in this case is -=
O, or equivalently,

1=0

(4)

The first-order condition for efficient damages (equation (4)) differs
from the first-order condition for socially optimal damages (equation
185 The analysis applies holding the tax s)stem 1(y) fixed in any configuration, including the optimal configuration.
186
See supra note 42; Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 816 n.20.
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(3)) by the covariance term cov[W'(V),a]. Thus whenever this
covariance is not zero, socially optimal damages will not equal efficient damages. Barring negligible coincidence, this covariance term
will be nonzero so long as both W'(v) and vd vary across the
population.
The term W'(v) will vary across the population so long as (1)
well-being v varies across the population1 8 7 and (2) W' varies in v, as it
will when Wis concave, reflecting the fact that the social planner cares
about equity in the distribution of well-being.
The term vd will vary over the population so long as changes in
the damages rule, d, do not impact the utility of all individuals by precisely the same amount, a condition violated in Kaplow and Shavell's
1 88
original model.
Equation (3) gives some information about the direction in
which damages should be adjusted away from their efficient level. If
cov[W'(), %d] is positive, then social welfare is increasing at efficient

damages and social welfare is improved by increasing damages above
the efficient level. This covariance is positive where W'(v) and Vd1
move together. Given a concern for equity, W is concave and W'(v)

moves against v. Thus, the covariance is positive where v and 1'd move
against each other, i.e., where those who are less well-off overall (those
with low v) are made relatively better-off by the change in the damages rule (high vd).
A symmetrical analysis applies when the covariance is negative.
There, damages should be lowered below the efficient level because
lowering damages tends to help those who are less well-off.
In accord with the discussion in Part III.B concerning the possibility of perverse outcomes, note that the equity adjustment here is
determined with respect to the covariance between the impact vd of
the change and overall well-being v, not just tort well-being v.
3.

Where Kaplow and Shavell's Tax Substitution Argument Falters
with Legal Heterogeneity: Mathematical Reprise

This subsection complements the analysis in section A concerning
Kaplow and Shavell's tax substitution proof. That section described
how Kaplow and Shavell prove the sub-optimality of redistributive
legal rules by showing that itis always possible to construct an alternative tax adjustment that mimics the redistributional impact of the
legal rule, and raises revenue to boot. It was argued that this construction

187 Well-being will vary across the population no matter how the income tax is structured. See Sanchirico, supra note 8, at 801.
188 See supraTechnical Appendix § B.1.
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relied on the assumption that all individuals were identical with respect
to the tort system. In the presence of legal heterogeneity, two things
go wrong withKaplow and Shavell's construction. First, the supplemental taxis not well defined whenthere are within-income-group differences:

the redistributional impact of the legal rule will not be replicable ith
a tax that is keyed only to income. Second, even in the absence of
within-group differences (i.e, even in the improbable case where individuals differ in their interaction with the legal system in tandem with
their income differences), substitution of the constructed tax supplementwillnotbe neutralwith respect to individuals' labor-leisure choices.
Without such neutrality, the tax supplement will not mimic the redistributional impact of the legal rule; neither is there any reason to think
that it will raise revenue.
This subsection restates these arguments, but now in the symbolic
notation of the Kaplow and Shavell model. The necessary technical
apparatus has, for the most part, already been laid out in section B.1.
However, we will now be considering damages rules that may depend
on the incomes of the parties to the action. 189 Thus, imagine any initial pair of tax and tort policies, to(y) and do(y), respectively. The individual's problem is that of choosing care x and income y to maximize

utility:

This form of the individual's problem differs from that discussed

above in sections B.1 and B.2 in several respects. First, the individual's

leisure-choice decision is stated in terms of choosing income rather
than leisure; in other words, 2a is substituted for E. This change is
for convenience only and is of consequence othenise. 190 Second,

damages are now a function of the defendant's income. This affects
the damages paid by our individual as well as the damages she receives.
Third, in contrast to the analysis in section B.2, the anal)yis in this
subsection is explicit about how legal heterogeneity enters the model.
The parameter y determines the impact of care effort x on the probability that the individual causes an accidentp(yx),justlike ct measures the
impact of labor effort Lon production and thus wages. Virtually any
source of legal heterogeneity will have the same effect in the analysis
that follows.

189 For simplicity, we will only consider damage rules that arc keyed solely to defendants' incomes. The analysis would be the same for the case considered by Kaplow and
Shavell in which both parties' incomes determine damages.
Assuming, of course, that a is never zero.
190
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As noted in section B.2, varying the distribution of'y allows us to
consider several different possibilities for legal heterogeneity. When y
is "trivially distributed," so that each individual has the same y, there is
no legal heterogeneity. When y is nontrivially distributed, but is a deterministic function of a (i.e., the distribution of y conditional on any
a is trivial), there is legal heterogeneity, but there are no within-income-group differences. The general case of heterogeneity even
within income groups is where is nontrivially distributed even conditional on 0.
Given our arbitrarily chosen pair of tort and tax policies, to(y) and
do(y), Kaplow and Shavell's tax substitution proposal consists of two
simultaneous policy changes. First, damages are set to their efficient
level, di(y) = h.19 1 Second, each individual pays, in addition to toCV), a
supplemental tax s(y) equal to how much better-off she is within the
tort system 19 2 under the new efficient-damages regime (or equivalently, and in line with Table 3 in section A, how much worse off she is
in the tort system when do(y) is used instead of dl(y)=h), Thus, letting
xi(a,',y) for i = 0,1 be the individual's care choice before and after the
change to efficient damages,
-

-[x4(ay) + p(yx.(a,-y)) + E[ (h-

)Il()

The double negative is retained so that what is being subtracted corresponds notationally with the relevant portion of individual utility (see

equation (5)).
We immediately encounter the first problem with the construction of this supplement to the income tax: Why should the right hand
side of equation (6) be expressible as a function solely of income,y?
In other words, why would an individual's income tell us precisely how
she benefits from the change from the initial damages rule do(y) to
efficient damages?
In the unaltered Kaplow and Shavell model, in which 'Y is the
same for all individuals, the right-hand side of equation (6) can indeed be expressed as a function of individual income. In this very
special case, we can ignore the variable -y. And since income is then
an invertible function 193 of U in each regime i = 0,1, we can replace

191 Setting damages equal to harm is still efficient even with the introduction of the
variable y. See the discussion surrounding equation (4) in this Technical Appendix.
192
Recall that due to Kaplow and Shavell's separability assumption it is possible to
isolate and discuss well-being with the tort system.
193 In particular, each level of income y is associated with no more than one level of
productive ability a. In fact, one can show that income will be strictly increasing in productive ability.
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every a on the right hand side of equation (6) with the corresponding
income level. We thus obtain
(y),-x

1

+ p(x,)h]

--[k('(

))+

(!h-(y)))d(y) + 4[&(I

j.)]].

(7)

Here 9 X(y) denotes the level of productive ability cc associated with
income y in regime i = 0,1. Further, the variable c has been eliminated from the first addend because care taken in the efficient-damages regime is a function of neither anory. Notice that in contrast to
equation (6) the right-hand side here is a function only of incomey.
The supplemental tax is also well defined with legal heterogeneity, so long as there is no heterogeneity within income groups. Technically, this is the case in which -y is related to a according to some
deterministic functional relationship 7=7(). In this case, within
each damages regime, each income level y is associated not only with
no more than one a, as above, but also-via ,(a)-no more than one
y. We may then replace each (6,y) in equation (6) with the corresponding y. Furthermore, y can be written as a function of y in both
regimes. All told, equation (6) can be rewritten with the right-hand
side varying across individuals as a function only ofy:

(8)

4y)= [x(y-'(y))+ +,(.(y'(y)))h]

Here y,'(y)denotes the (a,y) pair associated with y, and y,(y) denotes
the y associated with y in regime i = 0,1.
Even though the supplemental tax is well defined in the case of
no within-income-group differences, the second problem of the construction persists so long as there is any kind of legal heterogeneity.
Kaplow and Shavell's proof requires that each individual make the
same income choice under the new efficient damages/supplemental
tax regime as she did under the original regime. 19" The marginal
benefit to an individual with income y of increasing her income in the
old regime (d(y) , to(y)), is, by equation (5):

P(o0y)X )y]16-~more after.,wc income. lesls e

more dan'gm ifInjure

The marginal benefit to the individual of increasing income above y
in the new regime (dl(y) = h, tj (y) = to(y) + s(y)) is

194
The reason why income-choice neutrality is a necessary step in Kaplow and
Shavell's proof is explained in section A of this Technical Appendix.
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The issue is whether the marginal benefits of earning more income in
each regime, as just derived, are identical. This in turn reduces to the
question'whether s'(y) = p( 0 (y)X)do(y), that is, whether the marginal supplemental tax in the new regime is the same as the effective
marginal tax imposed by the adjustment of damages for income in the
old regime.
In the complete absence of legal heterogeneity-as in Kaplow
and Shavell's original model-the answer is yes. This is clear from
differentiating equation (7) with respect toy and using the envelope

theorem to eliminate derivatives in y that operate through changes in
Xo:

s'(y) = xo-" (1+ p'(xo))do(y) + p(xo)d'(y)
= p(xo)d'(y)

Note that the individual's utility-maximizing choice of x (ignoring y)
implies that (1 + p'(xo))do(y) = 0.
If we add legal heterogeneity, however, this equality will not obtain-even if there are no within-income-group differences, as was assumed in construction of equation (8). Differentiating
equation (8) with respect toy (with application of the envelope theorem to both xo and xl) produces an extra term:
s

=

pyo(y)X(y)+ (p'(y 1 (y x)y'(y)h- p'(yo (y -0 )yo (y)d(

.

(9)

extra term

Thus the marginal supplemental tax in the new regime does not equal
the effective marginal damages tax in the old regime.
Intuitively, the absence of income-choice neutrality with legal heterogeneity stems from the difference between simply imitating what
someone else does, with consequences determined by one's own payoff
functions, and actually stepping into someone else's shoes, in terms of
both her actions and her payoff function.
Thus, imagine that there is legal heterogeneity, but not within
income groups. Consider first the new regime with efficient damages

and the tax supplement given by equation (8) (which equation is constructed under the assumption that there are no within-income-group
differences). Imagine that the individual is deciding whether to
change her income from some arbitrarily chosen levely to some other
arbitrarily chosen level y' This change will affect her total tax bill via
her regular income tax and via the tax supplement. The change in
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the tax supplement will be the difference between two differences. In
particular, the change in her tax supplement wvill be the difference

between the benefit to y' income individuals of a move to the new
regime and the benefit to y individuals of the same regime change.
These regime change benefits differ across the two income levels for
two kinds of reasons.
First, there are the reasons that go solely to the differences in
income between these two groups of individuals. In particular, because individuals at different income levels pay different amounts in
damages in the old regime, the benefits they derive from switching to
the new regime will differ.
Second are the reasons that go directly to the parametric differences between individuals who choose to earn y' and individuals who
choose to earn y. By hypothesis, these differences are parallel to differences in chosen income levels. Yet it is worth noting for future
reference that they are not driven by income differences. Were an
individual in the y group to change her income to y', she would not
actually take on these different attributes of the group that chooses to
earn y' For example, in the discussion above surrounding equations
(8) and (9), the particular parametric difference considered was "care
ability" y. All individuals who chose a given level of income had the
same care ability, but had they decided to change their income, their
care ability would have remained the same.
Now consider the situation where an individual changes her income from y to y' in the old regime with inefficient damages. Again,
her regular income tax will change. In place of the change in the tax
supplement, however, we have the change in how the individual fares
in the income-contingent tort system. These two will differ. In the

old regime, the individual's well-being changes only for the first effect
mentioned above: the fact that she is choosing a different level of income. Because she still faces the same parameters, she does not fully
step into the shoes of those who chose y' optimally in the old regime
and the second effect mentioned above is absent.
The fact that the second effect is present only when the individual changes income under the supplemental tax and not under the
old income-contingent damages regime corresponds to the presence
of the extra term in equation (9). The extra term disappears only
when individuals at any y' income face the same tort payoff function
as individuals at any y income'95-i.e., only when all agents, within
and across income groups, are identical with respect to the tort

system.
195

Mathematically, this occurs when y'(y) = 0, for i = 0,1, in which case the extra term

vanishes.

